Оптимальный консерватизм и независимость центрального банка в условиях взаимодействия фискальной и монетарной политики
This paper studies fiscal policy in Russia 2004–2010 with the aid of structural budget balance and fiscal impulse measures. To check for robustness several methods estimating the potential GDP are employed. The research suggests a hypothesis that the output in Russia is subject to two types of shocks: persistent outward shocks and short-term internal shocks. In 2004–2010, fiscal policy coped with the internal shocks but could not smooth outward instability. Fiscal policy in Russia is procyclical; it does not stabilize the output.
The author traces the analysis evolution of the monetary shocks effects on the economy, exploring the key approaches to modeling of the monetary transmission mechanism. The article emphasizes the necessity of the monetary transmission mechanism modification in the conditions of current financial crisis: the active role reflection of the financial intermediaries, accounting of the development degrees of institutional capacity in the economy.
This paper analyzes a stylized model of an export-oriented economy. It investigates the impact of macroeconomic policies on the dynamics of the exchange rate, inflation, output and stabilization fund and consider different forms of strategic interaction between the government and the central bank. It is shown that the effective interaction of fiscal and monetary policies is possible under Stackelberg interaction with the government as leader and under cooperation.