Capital Structure Policy in Central Europe and BRIC: Interaction of Internal Determinants and Macroeconomic Factors
The debt-to-equity choice has always been one of the crucial decisions of the firm’s management. The capital structure is vital for the appropriate development of relationships among the company’s stakeholders. The conflicts of interests between management and shareholders and creditors as well as conflicts between other groups of stakeholders lead to the appearance of agency costs that decrease the corporate value. The role of agency costs is even higher in emerging markets due to higher information asymmetry, lower development of legal system, investors’ protection rights and corporate governance. Our paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the agency costs and capital structure choice on the data of emerging markets companies. Our sample consists of more than 150 companies from BRICS and Eastern Europe within 2000-2010. By conducting the empirical analysis based on both linear panel data regressions as well as simultaneous modeling of leverage choice and management shareholding we obtain the following results. The agency costs are relevant for debt-to-equity choice in Russia, India, China and Eastern Europe but the results are not so obvious in Brazil where financing policy could be explained by trade-off theory. We found out the non-linear relationship between financial leverage and management shareholding which is also in line with agency costs significance. Moreover we revealed that agency costs define long-term leverage, but cannot explain short-term debt in emerging markets. Further, we concluded that debt ratios based on market value of equity are not affected by agency costs opposite to capital structure variables based on book value of equity.
This paper provides an analysis of the debt burden of Russian companies and raises the issue of debt-level heterogeneity across economic sectors. To identify the causes of this heterogeneity, it estimates a regression model that includes both fundamental explanatory variables of companies and industry fixed effects. The results of the analysis demonstrate that standard variables, such as profitability, company size, asset turnover, and fixed-assetturnover ratio have a strong statistical significance. However, these do not fully explain the variation in the debt levels of companies in different sectors. According to model estimation, there are other industry specific factors that produce an imbalance between fundamental factors and companies’ debt levels. An understanding of the formation process and structure of debt burden in individual industries is extremely important for the financial stability of companies and for an effective monetary policy.
Despite a clear distinction in law between equity and debt, the results of such a categorization can be misleading. The growth of financial innovation in recent decades necessitates the allocation of control and cash-flow rights in a way that diverges from the classic understanding. Some of the financial instruments issued by companies, so-called hybrid instruments, fall into a grey area between debt and equity, forcing regulators to look beyond the legal form of an instrument to its practical substance. This innovative study, by emphasizing the agency relations and the property law claims embedded in the use of such unconventional instruments, analyses and discusses the governance regulation of hybrids in a way that is primarily functional, departing from more common approaches that focus on tax advantages and internal corporate control. The author assesses the role of hybrid instruments in the modern company, unveiling the costs and benefits of issuing these securities, recognizing and categorizing the different problem fields in which hybrids play an important role, and identifying legal and contracting solutions to governance and finance problems. The full-scale analysis compares the UK law dealing with hybrid instruments with the corresponding law of the most relevant US jurisdictions in relation to company law. The following issues, among many others, are raised:
– decisions under uncertainty when the risks of opportunism of the parties is very high;
− contract incompleteness and ex post conflicts;
− protection of convertible bondholders in mergers and acquisitions and in assets disposal;
− use of convertible bonds to reorganise and restructure a firm;
− timing of the conversion and the issuer’s call option;
− majority-minority conflict in venture capital financing;
− duty of loyalty;
− fiduciary duties to preference shareholders; and
− financial contract design for controlling the board’s power in exit events.
Throughout, the analysis includes discussion, comparison, and evaluation of statutory provisions, existing legal standards, and strategies for protection. It is unlikely that a more thorough or informative account exists of the complex regulatory problems created by hybrid financial instruments and of the different ways in which regulatory regimes have responded to the problems they raise. Because business parties in these jurisdictions have a lot of scope and a strong incentive to contract for their rights, this book will also be of uncommon practical value to corporate counsel and financial regulators as well as to interested academics.
Capital structure choice is among the key corporate decisions which influence its long term performance and it is considered to be one of the core problems in th theory of corporate finance. Despite the existence of plenty of empirical research papers in the area, many conceptual problems have not been resolved even for developed economies. The existing research on emerging markets covers only few countries within this group and does not provide empirical results for all classical capital structure concepts. The main research question of this paper is to explore whether the firms from Eastern and Central Europe follow the pecking order of financing. Does the pecking order concept underlie the motives for long term financing policies in industrial firms in emerging capital markets of Eastern and Central Europe?
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between capital structure and business process management (BPM) within ambidextrous firms. In particular, referring to the listed companies in the Mercato Telematico Azionario (MTA) and Mercato degli Investment Vehicles (MIV) markets with large- and mid-sized capitalization, divided into ambidextrous and non-ambidextrous companies, the authors examined the capital structure to fill a gap in the current literature.
This study uses a mixed-method sequential exploratory design. In particular, a qualitative study was conducted to identify some Italian-listed companies, called ambidextrous firms, which have implemented incremental (exploitative) and radical (explorative) innovations in an ambidexterity perspective of process management. A quantitative study was designed to provide insights into the different degrees of leverage of the listed companies selected by the qualitative analysis.
The research is based on an empirical analysis undertaken with 69 companies listed on Italian markets (starting from the MTA and MIV Italy 100 – large- and mid-sized capitalization). In particular, the authors highlight 11 companies that, based on the literature, can be defined as ambidextrous organizations. These firms, in each year analyzed (2014, 2015, and 2016), have more leverage than non-ambidextrous ones. Considering that firms today need to constantly revisit their portfolio of debt and equity, ambidextrous organizations could evaluate the largest debt available in order to implement new BPM tools.
To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first exploratory study based on capital structure and the simultaneous exploration and exploitation of knowledge (ambidexterity) that also is informed by a BPM perspective. The paper presents evidence from Italian-listed companies that are referred to as ambidextrous and have different degrees of leverage.