Модернизация: проблемы и программа осуществления
The efficiency of social reforms in different countries mostly depends on the extent to which they can be accepted by people. Moreover, even if the problems are similar, the reasons may differ, which can lead to fail in applying existing laws of one state to another one. Bribery, as shows the Corruption Perception Index, calculated by Transparency International, is a typical problem for developing countries – that also matches research (Levin & Satarov, 2000; Ilzetzki, 2010) concluding that corruption has roots in socialist regimes and that in recently established political stability instable economic situation leads to growth in crime. The main problem within the scope of this project is to identify the relation between corruption perception and level of trust in the society and to distinguish the differences in factors affecting these characteristics in post-soviet countries. The research discoveres that distrust matters a lot for the problem in Russia and suggests further examining European countries in order to explain the difference in trust.
At the present level of development the information and knowledge become important engines of global economic growth and key elements of national strate-gy for increasing country’s competitiveness in the international market. The article is aimed to analyze two monitoring systems of innovation capacity (ICT Development Index and Networked Readiness Index) as the indicators of development of knowledge economy and information society.
The Working Paper examines the peculiarities of the Russian model of corporate governance and control in the banking sector. The study relies upon theoretical as well as applied research of corporate governance in Russian commercial banks featuring different forms of ownership. We focus on real interests of all stakeholders, namely bank and stock market regulators, bank owners, investors, top managers and other insiders. The Anglo-American concept of corporate governance, based on agency theory and implying outside investors’ control over banks through stock market, is found to bear limited relevance. We suggest some ways of overcoming the gap between formal institutions of governance and the real life.