Структурный баланс бюджета и индикаторы фискальной политики
This paper studies fiscal policy in Russia 2004–2010 with the aid of structural budget balance and fiscal impulse measures. To check for robustness several methods estimating the potential GDP are employed. The research suggests a hypothesis that the output in Russia is subject to two types of shocks: persistent outward shocks and short-term internal shocks. In 2004–2010, fiscal policy coped with the internal shocks but could not smooth outward instability. Fiscal policy in Russia is procyclical; it does not stabilize the output.
Ключевые слова: государственная поддержка, эффективность, инвестиции, проекты, фискальная политика, выгоды
Chapter of the book examines the fiscal policy of Russia and, mainly, the creation of the Stabilization Fund as a mean to counter the negative effects of external macroeconomic conditions. The role of the Stabilization Fund in Russia in the early period of the crisis of 2008-09 was shown.
Once the legacy of the global financial crisis has been overcome, global GDP could grow at around 3% per year over the next 50 years. Growth will be enabled by continued fiscal and structural reforms and sustained by the rising share of relatively fast-growing emerging countries in global output. Growth of the non-OECD will continue to outpace the OECD, but the difference will narrow over coming decades. From over 7% per year over the last decade, non-OECD growth will decline to around 5% in the 2020s and to about half that by the 2050s, whereas trend growth for the OECD will be around on average 1¾ to 2¼% per year. The next 50 years will see major changes in the relative size of world economies. Fast growth in China and India will make their combined GDP measured at 2005 Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs), soon surpass that of the G7 economies and exceed that of the entire current OECD membership by 2060. Notwithstanding fast growth in low-income and emerging countries, large cross-country differences in living standards will persist in 2060. Income per capita in the poorest economies will more than quadruple by 2060, and China and India will experience more than a seven-fold increase, but living standards in these countries and some other emerging countries will still only be one-quarter to 60% of the level in the leading countries in 2060. In the absence of more ambitious policy changes, rising imbalances could undermine growth. As the current cycle unwinds, the scale of global current account imbalances may increase and return to pre-crisis peaks by 2030. Government indebtedness among many OECD countries will exceed thresholds at which there is evidence of adverse effects on interest rates and growth. Global interest rates may therefore start to rise over the long-term. Bolder structural reforms and more ambitious fiscal policy could raise long-run living standards by an average of 16% relative to the baseline scenario of moderate policy improvements. Ambitious product market reforms, which raise productivity growth, could increase global GDP by an average of about 10%. Policies that induce convergence towards best practice labour force participation could increase GDP by close to 6% on average.