Russia’s vision for G20 summitry
The G20 has proved that it can respond to crises. It has to live up to the expectations that it can prevent global risks, break dead locks other institutions responsible for resolving critical issues were unable to break. Challenging a plethora of skeptics G20 is now a long term process in motion. The G20 leaders’ decisions on the Mexican 2012 Presidency’s five priorities, which are broadly shared across the G20 members and beyond, are expected to advance global financial and economic stability; promote growth and jobs creation through structural reforms; make progress towards international financial institutions reform; strengthen financial regulation; enhance food security and mitigate commodity price volatility. The summit commitments and their implementation by the G20 and relevant international institutions will show how much the expectations held would prove to be the expectations met.
Economic inequality is increasing both within and across countries. Growing inequality has negative economic, social and political consequences, it constrains economic growth, undermines social cohesion and political stability. Eradicating causes of inequality and turning structural barriers to equality into opportunities is fundamental for generating strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth. Transition to this growth model will depend on G20 coherent policy actions globally and nationally.
In the run up to the St. Petersburg G20 summit the Civil 20 initiated preparing a report and recommendations to G20 focused on surmounting the risks originating from growing income inequality. A special Task Force, bringing together experts from G20 member countries has been established to draft the report. Presented and discussed within the Russian G20 Presidency Civil Society Track (www.g20civil.com), the report provides an independent analysis and proposals for a dialogue between a wide range of stakeholders and the G20 governors on the G20 concerted policies and actions to improve economic equality within their countries and beyond.
This set of policy recommendations on how G20 can address inequality takes full account of the existing authoritative, best available, consensus, analysis and evidence of the IMF, OECD, UNDP, other international organizations and relevant scholarly, civil society and policy communities, as summarized above. It builds directly upon the extensive evidence and analysis of the causes and practical policy cures for income inequality in the G20 member countries, as identified in the country reports prepared by and for members of the Civil 20 Task Force on Equity (currently including Australia, Canada, China, France, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Korea, Russia, Turkey and the US).
The Civil 20 propose that G20 leaders at their St. Petersburg summit can act together to improve income and economic equality within their countries and beyond by agreeing the Saint Petersburg Initiative for Strong, Sustainable, Balanced and Inclusive Growth affirming the value of equality and inclusion along with economic growth and efficiency.
If you build the present in the image of the past you will miss out entirely on challenges of the future. The first meeting of the G20 leaders originally set up as the finance ministers’ forum at the initiative of the G8 leaders2 more than a decade ago in 1999 after the Asian financial crisis, launched a new phase of development both of the international financial architecture and the global governance system. The EU participation in the G20 has been full scale from its birth, unlike gradual inclusion of the EU into the G7 processes. The reasons are clear. The internal factor defining the EU influence in the G20 was the beginning of the third stage of EMU and adoption of the single currency. Success of the euro as the single and a second reserve currency, its establishment as a factor of the global economic and monetary system, defined the EU role in the G20.
This paper attempts to put G8 and G20 institutions within the same assessment paradigm on the basis of a functional framework. This approach allows comparing the G8 and G20 across at least three groups of indicators: performance of global governance functions, accountability and compliance performance; contribution towards global governance agenda; and engagement with the other international institutions. It begins with outlining the methodology, and goes over to the main findings and conclusions on each of the dimensions. Thus the study contributes to building a quantifiable evidence base for an assessment of the G20 and G8 effectiveness and to inform forecast of their future roles.
The paper presents analysis of the G8 and G20 assistance to developing countries in overcoming the consequences of economic and financial crisis. It assesses the G8's and G20's implementation of key global governance functions and highlights their engagement with international organizations. In conclusion the author gives recommendations for rational division of labour between the institutions in international development assistance.
For the first time since World War II, the U.S. seem to lose leadership at the multilateral trade talks shifting accents to bilateral and regional trade cooperation. The main reason for the shift is a deadlock at the WTO Doha-round negotiations where the U.S. face opposition of the steadily growing economies of India, China and Brazil.
Торговые переговоры, ГАТТ, ВТО, США, многосторонняя торговая система, ЕС, Япония, ИНДИЯ, КИТАЙ, Бразилия, Дж. Буш-мл., Б. Обама, М. Баррозу, Р. Зеллик, П. Лами, Р. Кирк, Л. да Силва, Карел де Гюхт, АТЭС, НАФТА, АСЕАН, трансатлантическое партнерство, "двадцатка", trade talks, GATT, WTO, U.S., Multilateral Trading System, Eu, Japan, India, China, Brazil, G.-W. Bush, B. Obama, M. Barrozo, R. Zoellick, P. Lamy, R. Kirk, L. da Silva, Karel de Gucht, APEC, NAFTA, ASEAN, Transatlantic Partnership, G 20