In the article position of S. Kripke, which is presented in his lectures "Identity and necessity", is considered. The thesis is proved that necessity of identity for names with strict reference will be carried out on the whole universum of such names, as non-descriptive names do not have their own sense. It excludes for them reference to various objects (or to classes of objects). The identity of non-descriptive names is possible only in a case poly-naming of the same object or of the same class of homogeneous objects (in case of a general non-descriptive name).
The article is devoted to the study of the theological article as a representative of theoretical theological discourse. In the article, the determinants of this kind of discourse are singled out, determinants viewed as its key features enhancing the argumentative effect.
The paper deals with the so-called “golden triangle” of constitutive connections between meaning, reason, and modality. This classical triangle has been critically reassessed in contemporary analytical philosophy, but some forms of it still seem to be indispensible in studies of consciousness and AI. A lot of to-date anti-reductionist arguments are based on subtle nuances of relationships between the concepts of necessity and analyticity and a priori knowledge (e.g. “zombie” argument). The most effective tool for the study of these issues is the two-dimensional approach, developed by D. Chalmers and some other researchers. Author’s main concern is to analyze the basic concepts and methodological principles of two-dimensionalism in order to identify its vulnerable points and outline the limits of its applicability.
This work is mainly devoted to finding a place of ethical in early Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Science the problem of Ethics is inextricably linked with the logical point in “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” (role of logic in language, it’s relation to the world), considerations about the key issues are precede by a detailed analysis of Wittgenstein’s conception of logical space and object. It is important here that logic seems to be transcendental to the world. In other words, logical structure is necessary. However, it can be only shown. Both these cases are also essential for Ethics. In the end Aesthetics, defined as vision of the world from the point of view of necessity, is considered in relation with Ethics and logic.
The present paper deals with the latest version of Chalmers’ zombie argument which constitutes a serious challenge to materialism in the philosophy of mind. That version includes T- and I- clauses aimed to cope with some recent objections. J. Levine has demonstrated that so-called “Q factor” plays an important role in the argument justification. “Q factor”, though connected with “a priori entailment” problem, is considered by J. Levine apart from “I factor”. In accordance with his view we propose an alternative and more fundamental explanation for both “Q” and “I” factors’ role in the zombie argument. The key point of our approach is that supervenience conditional should be reformulated as a counterfactual one.