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The Complexity of Safe Manipulation under Scoring Rules
P. 246–251.
Ianovski E., Yu L., Elkind E., Wilson M.
Slinko and White, (2008) have recently introduced a new model of coalitional manipulation of voting rules under limited communication, which they call safe strategic voting. The computational aspects of this model were first studied by Hazon and Elkind, (2010), who provide polynomial-time algorithms for finding a safe strategic vote under k-approval and the Bucklin rule. In this paper, we answer an open question of Hazon and Elkind, (2010) by presenting a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a safe strategic vote under the Borda rule. Our results for Borda generalize to several interesting classes of scoring rules.
Veselova Y. A., Maastricht: Maastricht University, 2023.
Collective decision-making is a part of everyday life in modern society. People invented a variety of voting procedures for aggregating individual preferences into a collective choice. However, the problem is that people can misrepresent their preferences in order to achieve a more preferable voting result. This phenomenon is called manipulation and is considered negative since ...
Added: February 26, 2025
Polyakov N. L., Шамолин М. В., Труды семинара им. И.Г. Петровского 2023 Т. 33 С. 271–288
The work proves a number of properties of the class of non-local aggregation rules that simulate dynamic aggregation. ...
Added: January 11, 2024
Kondratev A., Ianovski E., / Series Computer Science "arxiv.org". 2023.
In social choice there often arises a conflict between the majority principle (the search for a candidate that is as good as possible for as many voters as possible), and the protection of minority rights (choosing a candidate that is not overly bad for particular individuals or groups). In a context where the latter is ...
Added: April 6, 2023
Gaivoronsky Y., Russian Politics 2023 Vol. 8 No. 3 P. 283–304
The study is devoted to strategic coordination represented as a list of “smart voting” candidates for single-member districts at the State Duma election on September 19, 2021. There is a great deal of skepticism in the literature that patterns of strategic voting can be found nationwide in Russia because of the prevalence of the personal ...
Added: December 11, 2022
Kemal Kıvanç Aköz, Alexei Zakharov, Social Choice and Welfare 2022 P. 1–37
We model costly, strategic voting in an electorate divided between a single pro-incumbent and multiple pro-opposition groups, and study the effect of the homogeneity of preferences within the opposition electorate on voter turnout. If each opposition group is represented by a separate candidate, there is a free-rider effect: the opposition turnout is lower if different ...
Added: November 1, 2022
Kuka V., Ianovski E., , in: Frontiers of Dynamic Games: Game Theory and Management, St. Petersburg, 2020.: Cham: Birkhäuser, 2021. P. 219–233.
Added: July 7, 2022
Ianovski E., Kondratev A., , in: The Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Technical Tracks 6Vol. 35. Issue 6.: AAAI Press, 2021. P. 5489–5496.
Added: June 3, 2021
Ianovski E., Annals of Operations Research 2022 Vol. 318 No. 2 P. 985–1000
We consider the problem of electing a committee of k candidates, subject to constraints as to which committees are admissible for constitutional, conventional, or practical reasons. In our framework, the candidates are given labels as an abstraction of a politician’s religion, a film’s genre, a song’s language, or other attribute, and the election outcome is constrained by ...
Added: May 27, 2021
Turovsky R. F., Sukhova M., Russian Politics 2020 No. 5 P. 329–353
This article examines the differences between Russian voting at federal elections and regional legislature elections, both combined and conducted independently. The authors analyse these differences, their character and their dynamics as an important characteristic of the nationalisation of the party system. They also test hypotheses about a higher level of oppositional voting and competitiveness in ...
Added: October 4, 2020
Ianovski E., Wilson M., Social Choice and Welfare 2019 Vol. 2 No. 52 P. 363–393
The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem is a cornerstone of social choice theory, stating that an onto social choice function cannot be both strategy-proof and non-dictatorial if the number of alternatives is at least three. The Duggan–Schwartz theorem proves an analogue in the case of set-valued elections: if the function is onto with respect to singletons, and can ...
Added: February 25, 2019
Turovsky R. F., European Politics and Society 2018 Vol. 19 No. 5 P. 595–622
The study of mixed electoral systems has gained in popularity due to frequent experiments with electoral systems in post-communist countries. Russia represents an interesting lab for this research, as it is a country that had switched to the proportional system in the 2007 parliamentary elections, and then moved back to mixed-member system in 2016 that ...
Added: November 2, 2018
Polyakov N. L., В кн.: VIII Международная конференция по математическому моделированию: тезисы докладов.: Якутск: Северо-Восточный федеральный университет им. М.К. Аммосова, 2017. С. 180–180.
The paper considers some new applications of the clone method in Computational Social Choice ...
Added: October 29, 2018
Turovsky R. F., Marina Sukhova, / NRU Higher School of Economics. Series PS "Political Science". 2017. No. WP BRP 55/PS/2017.
This research is focused on the issue of differences in results received in elections for regional and federal legislatures that are held according to the proportional system. In particular, the question of whether the authorities’ decision to favour the combination of synchronous regional and federal elections has proved effective. This research showed that, in simultaneous ...
Added: December 5, 2017
Vyacheslav V. Chistyakov, Procedia Computer Science 2014 Vol. 31 P. 1032–1035
In the case when alternatives are ranked by several equivalent criteria on the scale of three grades (bad, average,
good) we develop the axiomatics of preference functions for the superposition of the Borda and threshold preference
orders and present the explicit formula for the evaluation of the enumerating preference function. ...
Added: June 27, 2014