Логический гилеморфизм: от формальной онтологии к формальной деонтологии
The purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to clarify Ludwig Wittgenstein’s thesis that colours possess logical structures, focusing on his ‘puzzle proposition’ that “there can be a bluish green but not a reddish green”, (2) to compare model-theoretical and game-theoretical approaches to the colour exclusion problem. What is gained, then, is a new game-theoretical framework for the logic of ‘forbidden’ (e.g., reddish green and bluish yellow) colours. My larger aim is to discuss phenomenological principles of the demarcation of the bounds of logic as formal ontology of abstract objects.
In the article the author seeks to demonstrate the place of specific beings (like God) in possible worlds semantics. The general idea is an idea of multilevel ontology for possible worlds. It is effective to presuppose a special level for such being, for instance, in case the construction of the proof of the necessary existence.
In this paper I discuss a connection between model-theoretical, game-theoretical and ontological approaches to different types of formal relations. What is gained, then, is the correlation between the variety of formal relations and the variety of different approaches to the general idea of being formal expected to play a demarcating role for what is to count as logic.
It is generally accepted that the logical hylomorphism goes back to the Aristotelian form versus matter dichotomy. However, the role of Aristotle as the founder of logical hylomorphism may be challenged. The aim of this paper is to answer the question: in what sense (if any) was Aristotle the father of logical hylomorphism?
The aim of this paper is to systematize the variety of logical hylomorphism from the perspective of the dichotomy of substantial and dynamic formality. A brief historical review of the relation between different models of substantial and dynamic formality is given. The demarcation principles for the bounds of logic as formal ontology and formal deontology are discussed. Finally, a design-perspective on the normativity of logic is arguing for.
The aim of this paper is to provide a dynamic interpretation of Kant’s logical hylomorphism. Firstly, various types of the logical hylomorphism will be illustrated. Secondly, I propose to reevaluate Kant’s constitutivity thesis about logic. Finally, I focus on the design of logical norms as specific kinds of artefacts.