По другую сторону концепции открытости, прозрачности и этичности публичного управления: неформальные отношения муниципальных руководителей и их стратегии взаимодействия
The logic of interaction between state authorities and local self-government, in the conditions of constitutionally fixed independence of the branches of government, should be built on cooperation relations. The inter-municipal interactions of the administrations of urban and rural settlements with the regional authorities, since the two-level organization of local self-government is legislatively fixed, suggest, in addition to cooperation relations, also subordination relations. At the same time, the declared principles of openness, transparency and ethics in public administration exclude the building of interactions between authorities of different levels on informal relations.
Using the game-theoretic approach and as the basic model of interaction in a conflict situation, C. Thomas to describe the interaction between the leaders of government bodies of different levels (municipal district - settlement) and different branches (municipal - state power), we identified and described 4 possible types of one-dimensional models of interaction between authorities at different levels. The “normative” model (1) presupposes relations of cooperation as the main and leading in relations between managerial leaders. The "mobilization" model (2) presupposes relations of subordination, primarily between leaders of local and state levels. The “isolationist” model (3) implies a relationship of rivalry. The model (4) of “renunciation of authority” suggests that mutual avoidance is the basis of interactions between leaders. It was expected that the first two models of interactions, as normatively fixed relations of cooperation and subordination, would most closely correspond to the actual practice of interactions between leaders of government bodies. On the contrary, the last two models should have very limited value in management practice.
Real relationships are built on informal relationships using "forbidden" models, since interactions between managers are built primarily around the sharing of limited resources (financial, natural and administrative), which does not imply the principles of openness, transparency and ethics of public administration. In harsh conditions, the optimal interaction strategies for many grassroots leaders are submission or, on the contrary, intense rivalry, and by no means cooperation or avoiding interactions.