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Regular version of the site

Book chapter

Игровые равновесия в сети с экстерналиями

С. 79-84.
Матвеенко В. Д., Королев А. В., Бахтин М. А.
This paper studies a model of game interaction on a network with externalities, in which agents choose their levels of investment. We compare two concepts of equilibrium: standard Nash definition and “Jacobian” definition of equilibrium with externalities. It is shown that the equilibrium level of investment is equal to the agent’s alpha centrality. Also, we study the case of a complete network and show that an increase in its size facilitates active state of agents but reduces their utility.

In book

Игровые равновесия в сети с экстерналиями
Edited by: А. А. Васильев Ч. 1: Математика и статистика. Тверь: Тверской государственный университет, 2016.