Глава 12. Российская коррупция
The Handbook of Business and Corruption provides an overview of corrupt business practices in general and, more particularly, in different industry sectors, considering such practices from an ethical perspective.
The article is devoted to the analysis of the influence of the human factor on the corruption in the public authority. The corruption depends on the institutional quality of the public authority, its ability to withstand the negative manifestations of the human factor, and on the officials’ qualities. The motivation of "going to power" has a big significance. Under the authoritarian regimes, the corruption system is generated by the deformations in the election institution. The managerial lustration expediency for the power purification after the regimes' changes is substantiated. The institutional measures to combat the corruption have been identified.
The modern procurement system in Russia is considered to function economically and efficiently on the basis of principles of fair competition among its main participants. Practically the important principles of the procurement system are not implemented in all cases. The research agenda of authors focuses on the analysis of interactions between the economic agents in the procurement process, aimed at revealing the indicators of noncompetitive behavior between the buyers and the suppliers and only between the suppliers by means of econometrics (fuels and lubricants market of Moscow region as an example). The empirical data for the analysis consists of the information about the fulfilled purchases of oil-products in 4 neighboring districts of Moscow region: Orehovo-Zuevo, Pavlovskiy Posad, Egorievsk and Shatura in the period of 2007-2011.
The article aims to analyze the influence of different types of corruption on inflation in case of independent Central Bank and, therefore, absence of seignorage. Basing on fiscal and monetary policymakers behavior, we use simple model to analyze the joint impact of “grand” and “petty cash” corruption on the Central Bank optimal inflation rate. Research offers a slightly different view on the corruption-inflation relationship and concludes that different forms of heterogeneous corruption affects inflation in various ways both directly and indirectly.
This article uses the records of expenditures from a set of estates that belonged to the Golitsyn family to assess the level of ‘routine corruption’ in Imperial Russia in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The data from these books allow us to identify individual cases of unofficial facilitation payments made by the estates and by peasant communes to district-level officials; to delimit key types of payment situations; and to calculate the sums expended for payments by a given estate in a given year. The resulting numbers are compared to the overall volume of obligations borne by the serfs to the state and to their landlords. Our conclusion is that while the facilitation payments were ubiquitous and accompanied any interaction with the state, the volume of these ‘routine’ payments (as opposed to other forms of extraction) was quite low and they did not put a significant burden on the peasants, while at the same time securing hefty extra incomes for top district officials. Rather, by the last decades of the eighteenth century Russian Imperial officials at the district level might have switched from a tribute-like extortion from the population at large to acquiring vast sums by collecting unofficial payments in more targeted ways.