"Безумие" и "закон" в никоалевское царствование: Петр Чаадаев и Альфонс Жобар
The article analyses the history of madness in 19th century Russia. Mikhail Velizhev interprets the cultural and juridical context of Peter Chaadaev alleged "madness" using an almost identical case - that of a frenchman Alphonse Jobard who was accused to be mad for "political" reasons exactly at the same historical period.
This paper is aimed at exploring different interpretations of English revolutions (the Great rebellion of 1640s and the Glory revolution of 1688) in Chaadaev's first "Philosophical Letter", i.e. in its French original and in Russian translation published in 1836 in the Moscow review "Teleskop". First of all, this paper anasyses the discrepancies between two versions of Chaadaev's article, then Mikhail Velizhev reconstructs a possible reaction to its "English" fragments of Russian emperor Nicholas I basing on the hitherto unpublished archival materials (the excercise books of Nicholas dedicated to the English history).
The artical discusses the origins of the term "libertine" and its cognate, and explores certain aspects of "libertinage" and "dandyism" in the figures of Pushkin's contemporaries P.P. Kaverin and P.Ia. Chadaev, who find themselves together in the first chapter of Evgenii Onegin. The author demonstrates their differences on the basis of autobiographical texts and memoires of such contemporaries as P.A. Viazemskii, F.F. Vigel', I.D. Iakushkin
In this article author raises one of the most acute problems of human society, the problem of people’s behavior during periods of sharp social upheavals such as riots and revolutions. In comprehending great social upheavals, one can see how the mind disappears from society in these epochs, how the mind ‘falls asleep’, and how dreams give birth to monsters. The leader informs the crowd that everything is allowed, promising a golden dream first, and then a golden age. Husserl saw the decline of reason as the root cause of the European crisis in Revolutionary Russia in 1917. It was as if a numbness had struck the supporters of power, for they were fascinated by an unknown force since the February disaster. There was a “numb calm” (Heidegger). The personality disappears, the mind disappears, and society becomes simply a mass. After the abdication of the emperor who lived “the narrow realities of the present” (Schopenhauer) and who lost the ability to reason and assess the consequences of events, the elite sections of the Russian army were sworn in by the French ambassadors “whose names they did not even know”. It is understandable that the mind fell asleep not only of those in power, but also among its opponents. Then came the “great dope” (Bunin). Lenin, who was called a German spy and would arrive in a sealed car driven through a hostile Germany, would speak of the need for a civil war to the masses zombified by Bolshevik propaganda, and would be enthusiastically received.
An article from Mikhail Velizhev suggests a new interpretation of the rift between contexts that accompanied the creation and publication of Pyotr Chaadayev’s first «Philosophical Letter», as well as with the period in which the new political language Chaadayev used in his text was taking shape. The political language of French traditionalism had become fully consolidated in the political context of the Holy Alliance of European sovereigns; the ideology of this alliance was closely tied to one of the key texts of the Catholic tradition, Joseph de Maistre’s treatise «Du Pape». The foundational hypothesis of Velizhev’s article lies in the fact that, while actively using the language of the traditionalist-philosophers, Chaadayev was also reflecting upon the fate of the Holy Alliance.
Hegel’s anthropology is not just a doctrine of the human soul, feeling, and the subconscious, and not just the foundational section of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit as it took its final shape in the philosopher’s Berlin years. It is also, among many other things, a tale of resistance – of how the natural and the bodily resist their ‘idealization’ by Geist but ultimately become an ‘assimilated’ part of Geist (both ‘idealization’ and ‘assimilation’, as well as occasionally ‘resistance’, being Hegel’s own terms), although not without generating multiple moments of smaller, and more subtle, resistances and counter-resistances along the way. The goal of this chapter is not to address or question this assimilatory narrative of Hegel’s anthropological idealism as such, but to elucidate the more important of those moments and to introduce the anthropological logic of resistance as it permeates and runs through Hegel’s anthropology. To that end, I first turn to the inaugurative event of the anthropology in Hegel, that of the birth of Geist in its distinction from Natur, considered as a moment of resistance (against the natural) and transformation (of the natural). Next, I analyze the logic of anthropological subjectivity as it is developed further by Hegel through individuation and subjectivation, and argue that idealization is closely tied to resistance via the logic of the body and "self-feeling." Finally, I provide a reading of two of the anthropology’s culminating moments, madness and habit, which I take to be resisting each other within the two-center structure of subjectivity that Hegel puts forward. Taken together, these moments help uncover a motif of resistance running through the entire logic of Hegel's anthropology.