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Regular version of the site

Book chapter

Асимтотическая устойчивость смешанных равновесий для итеративных процессов в биматричных играх

С. 220-224.

In discrete time, asymptotic dynamics in the neighborhood of mixed equilibrium excludes coordination. However, this result is possible given specific payoff matrices. This paper considers characteristics of payoff matrices under which iterative process never converges to a mixed equilibrium, even if it starts from this. This suggests that asymptotically stability can be inherent to only pure equilibria. If sum of equilibrium mixed strategies is not equal to unity there is not convergence to a mixed equilibrium. From the standpoint of total payoff this means that a small change of the payoff matrix should result in that given any initial strategy distribution players acheive coordination and the related payoffs.