• A
  • A
  • A
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
Regular version of the site

Book chapter

Теоретико-игровая модель биржевых торгов со случайным моментом раскрытия инсайдерской информации

С. 8358-8362.

The paper considers a game-theoretical model of bidding with asymmetric information. One player has the inside information on the liquidation price of risky asset. The model is formalized with the repeated game with incomplete information on the side of uninformed player. We consider the case of external stopping of the game at the random moment. Insider's expected profit in the game of random duration if she applies the strategy optimal in infinite-stage game is obtained. This result allows to calculate the loss of insider in case of sudden disclosure of his private information.