Формирование стратегий поведения потребителя на рынке пищевых продуктов как элемент технологии обучения здоровью
In article legal problems of ensuring quality and safety of the food created in the Russian Federation or imported on her territory from other states are considered. The special attention is paid to the products containing GMO. Some legal ways of strengthening of a quality assurance and safety of food are offered.
Because use of GMO as the making element of food is regulated only by special regulations which haven't created uniform system of regulation of requirements to conditions and an order of introduction to civil circulation of genetically changed organisms at their first release in environment yet, industrial use and import, it is offered to add part the fourth with the Civil Code of the Russian Federation the new chapter "The right for the gene engineering modified organisms", having included in her norms on the special status of such results of intellectual activity (RIA), and also to provide special conditions and an order of use of the rights for them not only for the scientific purposes, but also introductions to civil circulation for implementation of the enterprise and bringing-in the income other activity.
Results of scientific researches of domestic scientists and young specialists in the sphere of the protected results of intellectual property are presented in the collection, the special attention is paid to offers on modernization of norms of part of the fourth of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation.
This paper discusses the question of whether the strategy of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is an effective signal of the high-level of food safety. Although the state mechanisms to reduce the problem of adverse selection acting, a large number of falsified and counterfeit food indicates its presence in the Russian food market. Specificity of food (its experimental and trusting qualities) makes it impossible for consumers to measure its quality characteristics before purchasing the product.
The analysis is based on the Bertrand model with differentiated product. As a result of game-theoretic modeling, conditions of formation of the "desirable" Nash equilibrium are obtained in which CSR policy is carried out only by the firms that produce safer products. The comparison of possible Nash equilibria leads to the conclusion that the effectiveness of CSR strategy as a safety signal is determined by the control and level of support of the state, and by the proportion of "responsible" consumers who care about their health. We can have a "desirable" Nash equilibrium in the absence of "responsible" consumers, but only if the state controls and provides a high level of support to businesses that produce safer products. This means that among the factors responsible for the low activity of producers in the area of corporate social responsibility (CSR) there is the weakness or absence of mechanisms to support producers from the state as well as a small proportion of consumers who are concerned about their health, their weak activity in the assessment of the safety level when choosing foods.