Международный экспертный диалог по преодолению кризисных явлений в сфере контроля над вооружениями и ядерного нераспространения.
The reasons for the collapse of the IMF Treaty are diverse. The Treaty appeared in the bipolar era – and now we live in a multipolar world, where different centers of power coexist, pursuing their own interests. In addition, the military-technical progress achieved in recent years was bound to erode the strategic balance between nuclear "superpowers" that had emerged during the cold war.
The demise of this crucial disarmament agreement will have the most negative consequences for the entire disarmament and non-proliferation mechanisms. The collapse of the INF Treaty could be the final nail in the coffin of arms control. Given the close and inextricable link between disarmament and non-proliferation, the non-proliferation process is not likely to survive the collapse of arms control. The consequences for international security can be totally unpredictable – unstable States in a state of permanent hostility with the outside world may obtain nuclear weapons. In order to solve the problem of nuclear stability, there is absolutely no alternative to engaging other nuclear powers, including undeclared ones, in a dialogue on this issue, as well as the need to take into account the consequences of military – technical progress over the last third of a century since the signing of the INF Treaty.
The relations between Russia and America are experiencing presently the deepest (at least since the end of the Cold War) crisis. The Russian-American dialogue on arms control is in decline, contacts between the two countries at the highest and high political levels have sharply decreased, and the inter-parliamentary dialogue is almost completely curtailed; under the yoke of American sanctions and Russian counter-sanctions, trade and economic ties between the United States and Russia are already deteriorating. The only way out in the current situation in Russian – American relations is to reduce the ideological component in Russian-American relations and, accordingly, increase the share of realpolitik in these relations. It should be noted that Moscow and Washington had to solve a similar problem during the Cold War. It is these ideological processes that made the Soviet-American détente possible. As long as similar processes do not occur in modern Washington, the ideological factor will remain a strong irritant in Russian-American relations.