Волновая концепция сознания как модификация гуссерлевской концепции (онтологии) сознания/ ‘Wave’ theory of consciousness as a modification of Husserl's theory of consciousness
The paper presents the ‘wave’ concept of consciousness, which is based on Husserl's concept of consciousness (Zeitbewuβtsein) as a ‘temporal flow’. Thus, to solve the problem ‘mind – body’ we offer a conceptual distinction between ‘wave vs. thing’, in which we understand the consciousness as ‘wave’ superstructure above brain. The conceptual basis for this is Plato’ distinction ‘body vs. soul’, which we complement categorical apparatus of the “new ontology” (N.Hartmann).
The article deals with the Malcolm’s version of the ontological argument and its variation proposed by Hartshorne. It also highlights some "eternal" problems which are to be faced by everyone who wish to consider the ontological argument as a purely logical proof.
The book review evaluates the collective work of 12 scholars which retrace and blueprint new trends in the current phenomenology, especially оn the junction between German-Austrian and Russian-Slavic cultural and intellectual areas.
Russian researchers polemics on Kants essay On a supposed right to tell lies from benevolent motives in which Kant argues that if a malefactor (a murderer) who is going to kill a persons friend asks that person where ones friend is, the morality requires to tell the truth. It is proved in the paper that though Kantians are usually considered as absolutists and their opponents - as relativists, the Kantians perform a large-scale relativization of maxim of truthfulness and exhibit more conformity to lie than the relativisits do. Paradoxes A Precious Friend and Kants Generalized Consequence for Many Friends showing inconsistency and contradictoriness of Kantians point of view are introduced. The confrontation of absolutists and relativists is interpreted as a fundamental opposition of reductionism and holism followers, with understanding that in this case the opposition is many times strengthened by confrontation of moral values.
This article discusses the problem of the so-called objectless presentations, which was largely discussed within Austrian philosophy of the 19th century. Our analysis is concentrated on the evolution of understanding and status of objectless presentations in works of three main authors of this tradition: The Theory of Science by B. Bolzano, On Content and Object of Presentations by K. Twardowski and Intentional Objects by E. Husserl. For the first time the thesis on objectless presentations was offered by Bolzano (1837), who gave precise characteristics to objects, which do not correspond to any type of presentation. Later, Bolzanos ideas were reactualized by Twardowski (1894). Logical and psychological study of the latter was mainly based on his interpretation of Brentanos conception, and particularly on his own understanding of intentionality. Twardowski in his investigations wrote about a necessity of special differentiation between the content of presentation and the immanent object, where the latter was considered as intentional and real. Thus, from Twardowskis point of view, the idea of objectless presentations is based on a visible mistake: nonexistence of an object is always confused with its nonbeing presented. Also the matter of exceptional importance is his analysis of the notion nothing. This notion was originally brought into the discussion by Bernard Bolzano, who used it as an example of objectless presentation. As an answer to this Twardowski presented the logical analysis of nothing and proved that it (in terms of Mills logic) is not a name, or, in other words, it is not a categorematic, but syncategorematic expression. Husserls essay in some way finishes this discussion. Here we should pay attention to the problem of the context Husserl was writing his work (1894) in. Intentional Objects was the first work Husserl did not write in the tradition of Brentanos descriptive psychology. Under the influence of Frege and Bolzano, Husserl becomes a radical critic of psychologism, and, of course, he successfully ridiculed the thing as an assumption of existence of such essences as content of presentation. Accordingly, as he took up the position of logicism he sharply criticized various attempts of assuming the real existence of those things, which are logically impossible. Thus, we can note, that this analysis allows us to find out the key opposition, which characterizes philosophy of those times: the opposition of psychologism and logicism.
Cet ouvrage vise à déterminer la manière de travailler qui est propre à la philosophie phénoménologique et à la montrer à l’œuvre. Il s’agit pour cela de définir le changement phénoménologique d’attitude comme « dé-limitation » de la vie de la conscience et la méthode phénoménologique comme « enrichissement mobile de sens », pour apercevoir que la dé-limitation, à travers l’enrichissement de sens, conduit à l’institution d’un nouveau mode de recherche. Mais de quelles limitations le changement d’attitude libère-t-il ? Qu’apporte l’enrichissement de sens qui soit proprement nouveau ? Dans quelle mesure cette « nouveauté » serait-elle instituée dans le cadre de la phénoménologie ?
This book examines phenomenology as working philosophy (Arbeitsphilosophie), that is, as an open research project. The main aim of the study consists in determining the mode of performance (Vollzugsweise) of the phenomenological work in progress. To achieve this goal we provide an analysis of the doctrine of attitude (Part I.), the doctrine of method (Part II.), and then the “flexible” architectonics (Part III.) of phenomenology. These elaborations enable us to thematize the de-limitation of consciousness (Entschränkung), the enrichment of sense (Sinnbereicherung) and the institution of the new as the characteristic features of the phenomenological method of operating. This research project requires a constant oscillation between an open systematization of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy and particular phenomenological analyses.