Парадокс Фитча и кризис антиреализма
The theory of history is again undergoing yet another transformation. Linguistic and cultural turns have occurred and have been completed. A new paradigm which, with certain precaution, could have been named “back to reality” is on its way. The ongoing metamorphose of epistemological foundations is characterized by unprecedented interest of historians to the problems of historical time. At the same time, this change allows a discussion not only about considerably new vision of historical time but also that of historical space. In the first part of this article we discuss several indicators of radical innovations in the theoretical history which occurred just in the past few years. In the second part we analyze new approaches to historical time.
This paper proposes a disjunctivist interpretation of the relation between Tractarian "symbols" and Tractarian "signs" and shows why, if such an interpretation is correct, the Tractarian conception of language is netiher realist nor constructivist.
Arguments from knowability have largely been concerned with cases for and against realism, or truth as an epistemic vs. non-epistemic concept. This article proposes bringing Peirce’s pragmaticism, called here ‘action-first’ epistemology, to bear on the issue. It is shown that a notion weaker than knowability, namely conjecturability, is epistemologically a better-suited notion to describe an essential component of scientific inquiry. Moreover, unlike knowability, conjecturability does not suffer from paradoxes. Given fundamental uncertainty that permeates inquiry, knowability and what Peirce took to be ‘perfect knowledge’ lose their appeal in epistemology of science. From the points of view of the logic for pragmatics and the modal translations given in this article, conjecturability and pragmaticism provide an enriched epistemology for scientific practices that can accommodate both epistemic and non-epistemic values.
The purpose of this article consists in identification of the bases of a normativeness in modern ethics, object of studying in which is not practice, but moral knowledge. The modern moral philosophy developed from opposition between intellectualism where the Good was thought in categories "true" and "false", and sentimentalism for which there is no moral truth, but there are only moral emotions and feelings. Today this discussion is still actual, however it has got new sense in connection with criticism of ethical rationalism and realism in modern metaethics.