Построение институционально-экономического пространства функционирования бизнеса
In this study, for the first time in Russian practice from a large amount of empirical data on state contracts for procurement of goods, works and services, made a major budgetary organization during 2008-2010., Examines factors affecting the decline in trading, delays in supplies, as well as problems in the performance of obligations under the contracts. The analysis showed that a reduction prices at the auctions directly dependent on the number of applications accepted for review by the competitive commissions. Falling prices are more frequent in the procurement of goods and experimental trust (compared to the benefits of the inspection), as well as a state contract for works. However, the prices are much less likely to have been lowered in auctions (compared to purchasing through quotations and tenders). Delays in supplies occurred in 27% of patients and were more frequent in the procurement of experimental benefits, and were characterized for major purchases and state contracts executed during the I-III quarters of the year. More serious problems in the performance of obligations, full fraught with supply disruptions, have characterized the state contracts, culminating in the IV quarter. The overall risk supply disruptions were reported only 5% of purchases at competitive procedures, but on the contracts accounted for nearly half of all purchases of the budget organization in 2008-2010. Based on the analysis in the formulation of recommendations to improve the system of public procurement.
The chapter of the book systematically examine various effects of resource curse in such arenas as rule of law and property rights in Russia in comparison with the other oil-and-gas exporting countries beginning from the XXI century.
Corruption has been a constant factor in Russia’s political economy. From one era to another, the multifarious forms of corruption continue to pervade Russian politics despite sincere and insincere efforts to fight it. The election of Vladimir Putin as president in 2000 brought a new effort at consolidating and organizing authority in the country. However, far from eliminating corruption, politics of the Putin era have merely changed the form of corruption, integrating corruption into the “power vertical” through which Putin governs.
In recent years, corruption has played an ever larger role in the regime’s stability. It serves as a force to co-opt and control the political elite and to replace formal institutions with something more flexible and more amenable to the needs of a consolidated authoritarian regime. Only deep changes, such as higher levels of political competition, have a chance of reducing corruption in the long run. The approaching fourth term of President Putin will continue to increase the role of informal institutions in Russian politics, in which corruption plays an increasingly large role in the Kremlin’s management of the political process.
The purpose of the current research is to provide empirical evidence for the relations between macroeconomic, political and legislative factors and grassroots corruption in Russia. The dominating goal of the research is to analyze the dynamics of factors, that create incentives for passive bribery at individual level and to reveal if there are structural breaks in the model related to the changes in anticorruption laws. Empirical part of the research is mainly based on the data of the "Russia Longitudinal Monitoring survey, RLMS-HSE”-2006.
This paper surveys the literature on decision-making in international sports organizations. The International Olympic Committee, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association and many other federations delegate decision-making to internal committees. A complicated structure of those committees that reflects the international status of federations, a unique type of decisions that is inherent to sports industry, and specific decision-making mechanisms attract the researchers’ attention. The survey is comprised of four paragraphs. The first paragraph briefly reviews papers aimed at studying preferences of the international sports federations committee members. The second paragraph is devoted to papers that analyze determinants of success of bids for hosting sporting mega-events. In the third paragraph we discuss different ways to fight corruption in decision-making bodies of international sports federations. Finally, we touch on the problem of accountability in international sports federations. The focus of the paper is on the economics literature, and it is not aimed to discuss a wide literature on such topics as management of sport organizations or psychology of decision-making.
There is a commonly held belief that police corruption in Russia is rampant. While many scholars have proposed policies on how Russian police can modernize, extant research has been static or linear. Studying the history of the developed nation-states which have successfully tackled corruption and experienced similar social organizations of shadow practices is a better approach to designing an anti-corruption policy for Russia, rather than simply borrowing foreign practices with little reference to their socio-political development. Drawing upon the Australian experience of police corruption and reform in the 1950s, we suggest anti-corruption policies for the contemporary Russian police force. To do this, we apply an event structure analysis (ESA) to identify the key organizational and institutional factors which contributed to the formation and subsequent dissolution of the First Joke, a corrupt police network which operated in the Queensland Police Force from 1950s—1980s. We design our policy recommendations taking into consideration the particularities of the Russian police and our ESA of the First Joke. Our analysis suggests that curtailing cumbersome state regulations and the over-reliance on police performance evaluation, establishing democratic oversight, improving the current recruitment and selection system, developing community policing alongside further market liberalization and democratization could be effective policies for Russia.
The problem of inefficient activity of small innovative enterprises (IIP) is one of the reasons for the slow development of scientific institutions, including the RAS institutes. The state is gradually reducing their funding, forcing the leadership of institutions to seek the commercialization of the created intellectual property (IP). Many factors influence the activities of IIPs, such as legislative, personnel, financial, infrastructure, information and others, but administrative barriers are among the most significant. Within the framework of this study, the influence of each administrative factor on the activities of existing spin-off companies of RAS institutes is being studied. Among the main tasks of this work, one can note a detailed analysis of Russian and foreign literature on the topic of research, the study of administrative barriers, as well as an expert survey of representatives of the RAS institutes in order to identify the most significant factors for the activities of IIPs. An expert poll was conducted by phone with a pre-prepared list of questions.
Based on the results of the study, we can conclude that the most attention requires regulatory barriers. This area requires the development of a set of measures to improve their effectiveness.
An important risk factor is the weak protection of intellectual property, which not only deprives innovation of the opportunity to be realized, but also contributes to the leakage of technology. This problem is proposed to be solved by introducing a procedure for preliminary patent applications.
In addition, it is important to continuously improve the level of knowledge in the field of patenting, intellectual property rights and entrepreneurship by research organizations.
The above methods are only part of a large set of measures to reduce some of the administrative barriers in the process of commercializing innovation.