Book
Моделирование спроса на деньги в российской экономике в 1999–2008 гг.
М.: Институт Гайдара, 2010.
Трунин П. В., Дробышевский С. М., Синельникова-Мурылева Е. В., Кузьмичева Г. В.
Research target:
Economics and Management (including Public Administration)
Priority areas:
economics
Language:
Russian
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