Язык, онтология и реализм
The book deals with revealing the specifics of realism as represented in the analytical philosophy of the 20th century. The problem of realism is investigated in the context of the ontological approach, which is based on an analysis of the structure of language we are using to talk about reality. It traces the evolution of ideas leading of analytic philosophers (Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Rudolf Carnap, W.V.O. Quine, P. F. Strawson, Donald Davidson, and others) about the relations between language and reality. The concepts of Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam about the nature of the analytical realism are analyzed and compared.
The edition is for philosophers, historians of philosophy and culture, all who are interested in the development of metaphysics in the 20th century. The book may be useful for students of modern philosophy, as well experts researching key ontological and metaphysical problems of modern philosophy.
Drawing upon exegetical and scientific writings of Isaac Newton, his followers (W. Whiston) and opponents (Ch. Burnet), present study deals with the rise of objectivism – fundamental epistemic principle underlying the modern scientific worldview. The study is focused upon the synthesis of three epistemological principles, which shaped the science of Enlightenment: hermeneutic transparency of text in exegesis, mathematical certainty in natural science, and realistic mimesis in literary criticism. The author also examines the epistemological project, opposed to objectivistic paradigm, that puts together allegory in biblical scholarship, hypothetical method in physic and the primacy of literariness over referentiality in literary theory. Present article seeks to contribute to the genealogy of objective reality – ontological a priori of the modern scientific thought, emerged from the confusion of methodologies and discourses, characteristic to early Modern Times.
On the one hand, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is admittedly the integrative part of the history of phenomenological movement. On the other hand, the hermeneutical subject area, as well as disciplinary self-awareness of hermeneutics, diverges considerably from that of the initial E. Husserl's phenomenological project. This fact serves as a motif for reconstruction of the intrinsic logic of the phenomenological movement. The aim of such reconstruction is to answer the following questions: What is the reason for including philosophical hermeneutics into phenomenological philosophy? What role does hermeneutics play in the history of the phenomenological movement? The interpretation of phenomenological subject area in terms of primordial phenomenality serves as a horizon for this reconstruction of the essential logic of phenomenological research. Such understanding of phenomenological philosophy focus has priority over conventional characteristics of phenomenological subject matter as a variety of phenomena accessible within special methodological attitude. It allows, first of all, to avoid fragmentation of the area of primordial, i.e. phenomenological phenomena and to minimize presuppositions. The totality of phenomenality blocks constructivism inherent to descriptive phenomenology and in consequence limits the application field of reflexive or methodological approaches. The process of disclosing or articulating primordial phenomenality can be described as phenomenologising. Eventually, phenomenology as an explicative method is regarded as the first part of the two-level process of phenomenologising. The second part of this process is the spontaneous self-disclosing of primordial phenomenality. The idea of two-level phenomenology (phenomenology as a method and as a spontaneous event) has been differently realised in Heidegger's and Gadamer's phenomenological-hermeneutical conceptions. From the very beginning Heidegger stands up for the performative, i.e. existential-practical understanding of phenomenological explication. According to him, phenomenology does not so much explicate phenomena but points at those areas and forms of experience where that explication occurs spontaneously. Still, Heidegger is oriented at the explication of static structures of these experiences (which he calls existentialities), which allows us to speak about rudimentary transcendentalism of his philosophical position. In his late works Heidegger emphasises the world-disclosing potency of ontic experiences. Gadamer develops this tendency considering various everyday experiences such as perception of art, participation in rituals, reading, and etc. to be areas of spontaneous phenomenologising.
The article considers the Views of L. N. Tolstoy not only as a representative, but also as a accomplisher of the Enlightenment. A comparison of his philosophy with the ideas of Spinoza and Diderot made it possible to clarify some aspects of the transition to the unique Tolstoy’s religious and philosophical doctrine. The comparison of General and specific features of the three philosophers was subjected to a special analysis. Special attention is paid to the way of thinking, the relation to science and the specifics of the worldview by Tolstoy and Diderot. An important aspect is researched the contradiction between the way of thinking and the way of life of the three philosophers.
Tolstoy's transition from rational perception of life to its religious and existential bases is shown. Tolstoy gradually moves away from the idea of a natural man to the idea of a man, who living the commandments of Christ. Starting from the educational worldview, Tolstoy ended by creation of religious and philosophical doctrine, which were relevant for the 20th century.
The article is concerned with the notions of technology in essays of Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger. The special problem of the connection between technology and freedom is discussed in the broader context of the criticism of culture and technocracy discussion in the German intellectual history of the first half of the 20th century.