Перекрестки культур: Александр Койре, Александр Кожев, Исайя Берлин
This article presents two French interpretations of Anselm’s Ontological Argument. The first one was proposed by Alexandre Koyré (1892-1964) in his early book The Idea of God in the Philosophy of St. Anselm (1922). Koyré considers Anselm’s philosophy being the part of Neo-Platonist tradition along with Augustin, Pseudo-Dionisius and Eriugena. But he also found in Anselm’s argumentation a quasi-phenomenological recognition of the intentionality of the consciousness that guarantees the openness of thought to the transcendent reality. This idea was further developed by Belgian jesuit Paul Gilbert in his book dedicated to Proslogion of St. Anselm. He reads Anselm’s Argument in the vein of French reflexive philosophy and points out that the negation of the id quo maius cogitari nequit existence is at the same time the negation of the act of thought itself.
En révélant l’influence de l’interprétation de Koyré dans les lectures que fait Henry de la philosophie boehmienne, je propose d’interroger la position henryenne qui, en s’appuyant sur les concepts classiques de l’originaire et de l’authentique, refuse au monde – et par là à toute connaissance théorique – le statut de vérité. Je me demande donc s’il est suffisant d’exclure chaque tentative d’expression de la manifestation de l’Absolu. Peut-être faut-il relire le projet de la phénoménologie comme une science descriptive plutôt que prescriptive ?
The article analyses the link between the famous French epistemologists Emile Meyerson and his younger friend and disciple, historian of science Alexandre Koyré. Koyré is known primarily by his research of the history of the scientific thought; his main interest was to grasp the moments of the transformation of rational structures within the history. Nevertheless, in this paper I will argue that Alexandre Koyré in some measure accepts Emile Meyerson’s claim on the immutability of human reason that constitutes the central point of Meyerson’s epistemology. But within the rationality in general he distinguishes the immutable core that is constituted by the logical laws of reasoning and the outer level of “mentality” which is subjected to the historical changes and transformations.
The author analyses the problem of truth as it is presented in the interpretations of Martin Heidegger and Alexandre Koyré, covering Plato’s Republic. Heidegger reads it primarily as a poetic myth of concealment and disclosure, revealing the intellection of Being. The space of political is a space of a historical manifestation and at the same time of the concealment of truth. The history of manifestation of truth is also a history of hiddenness and oblivion. Thereafter the untrue, being a privative mode of the true, no more opposes it; the true and the untrue do not make up a hierarchical pair. Koyré gives a completely different treatment of the Republic, reading it as a dramatical piece, forcing the reader to take sides. The truth is self-referring and placed at the high end of the hierarchy of values ladder, whereas the untrue (as distinct from the plain error) is always a deception, designed to disrupt the horizontal bonds between the citizens that constitute the political space as such. While for Heidegger the paradigmatic example of Dasein relation to Being is a poet who is sort of privy to God, Koyré keeps in place the hierarchical deference of the untrue world of the religious and mythopoetical to the true world of science. The author of the article demonstrates the inseparable link between the aesthetic visions and the political conceptions entertained by Koyré and Heidegger.
The topic of the present research is to demonstrate the key transformations of the intellectual practice related to the development of such category as negativity (non-existence) in the modern philosophy. Historically, classical philosophical solution to the problem of negative was to place it in the domain of transcendential, i.e. to substitute it with God, noumenality, will, etc. However, the conclusion of the post-Hegelian reflections is that the negative should be reunited with the world through man, who ultimately represents a part of this world. This inclusion of negative into the structure of Being, i.e. basically the ontologization of non-being, allows for integration of praxis into the world. Human dimension in this case is no longer a side effect, a consequence of a primary autonomy of the world, but represents that form through which the world comes to existence. This strategy of thematization of negative as the bases for transition from fundamental ontology to fundamental anthropology becomes the key theme for a number of philosophical contexts of the 20th century (Kojève, Sartre, Heidegger). At the same time, this strategy might be countered by another alternative, when negative is understood in such a way as to fully implement its own differential instead of substantial mission. Study of many concepts conceived in the 20th century shows that the main principle of this alternative was grossly disregarded – various excuses were used to subject negative to inadmissible for nonexistent substantivization. Had we reserved the only role for negativity – to manage the movement of distinctions and to distinguish – we could have avoided both – the antinomies found in classical philosophy as well as disappointments accompanying philosophical thought of the modern period.
References to the problem of the End of History are not infrequent in various political, cultural and philosophic discussions. This notion is often postulated as something quite apparent or as something of great influence and which nevertheless both are attemted to be refuted. The purpose of the paper is to follow philosophic roots of this conception and observe conditions and stages in its development.
To commemorate the 50th anniversary of his passing (in 2014), this special book features studies on Alexandre Koyré (1892–1964), one of the most influential historians of science of the 20th century, who re-evaluated prevalent thinking on the history and philosophy of science. In particular, it explores Koyré’s intellectual matrix and heritage within interdisciplinary fields of historical, epistemological and scientific thought. Koyré is rightly noted as both a versatile historian on the birth and development of modern science and for his interest in philosophical questions on the nature of scientific knowledge. In the 1940s and 1950s, his activities in the United States established a crucial bridge between the European historical tradition of science studies and the American academic environments, and an entire generation of historians of science grew up under his direct influence. The book brings together contributions from leading experts in the field and offers much-needed insights into the subject from historical, nature of science, and philosophical perspectives. It provides an absorbing and revealing read for historians, philosophers and scientists alike.
The article considers the Views of L. N. Tolstoy not only as a representative, but also as a accomplisher of the Enlightenment. A comparison of his philosophy with the ideas of Spinoza and Diderot made it possible to clarify some aspects of the transition to the unique Tolstoy’s religious and philosophical doctrine. The comparison of General and specific features of the three philosophers was subjected to a special analysis. Special attention is paid to the way of thinking, the relation to science and the specifics of the worldview by Tolstoy and Diderot. An important aspect is researched the contradiction between the way of thinking and the way of life of the three philosophers.
Tolstoy's transition from rational perception of life to its religious and existential bases is shown. Tolstoy gradually moves away from the idea of a natural man to the idea of a man, who living the commandments of Christ. Starting from the educational worldview, Tolstoy ended by creation of religious and philosophical doctrine, which were relevant for the 20th century.
This important new book offers the first full-length interpretation of the thought of Martin Heidegger with respect to irony. In a radical reading of Heidegger's major works (from Being and Time through the ‘Rector's Address' and the ‘Letter on Humanism' to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art' and the Spiegel interview), Andrew Haas does not claim that Heidegger is simply being ironic. Rather he argues that Heidegger's writings make such an interpretation possible - perhaps even necessary.
Heidegger begins Being and Time with a quote from Plato, a thinker famous for his insistence upon Socratic irony. The Irony of Heidegger takes seriously the apparently curious decision to introduce the threat of irony even as philosophy begins in earnest to raise the question of the meaning of being. Through a detailed and thorough reading of Heidegger's major texts and the fundamental questions they raise, Haas reveals that one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century can be read with as much irony as earnestness. The Irony of Heidegger attempts to show that the essence of this irony lies in uncertainty, and that the entire project of onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, therefore needs to be called into question.
The article is concerned with the notions of technology in essays of Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger. The special problem of the connection between technology and freedom is discussed in the broader context of the criticism of culture and technocracy discussion in the German intellectual history of the first half of the 20th century.