Book
Frontiers of Dynamics Games: Game Theory and Management, St. Petersburg, 2018
This book is devoted to game theory and its applications to environmental problems, economics, and management. It collects contributions originating from the 12th International Conference on “Game Theory and Management” 2018 (GTM2018) held at Saint Petersburg State University, Russia, from 27 to 29 June 2018.
For the discrete-time superreplication problem, a guaranteed deterministic formulation is proposed: the problem is to ensure the cheapest coverage of the contingent claim on an American option under all admissible scenarios. These scenarios are set by a priori defined compacts depending on the price history; the price increment at each moment of time must lie in the corresponding compact. The market is considered without trading constraints and transaction costs. The problem statement is game-theoretic in nature and leads directly to the Bellman–Isaacs equations of a special form under the assumption of no trading constraints. In the present study, we estimate the modulus of continuity of uniformly continuous solutions, including the Lipschitz case.
This volume is dedicated to the 80th anniversary of academician V. M. Matrosov. The book contains reviews and original articles, which address the issues of development of the method of vector Lyapunov functions, questions of stability and stabilization control in mechanical systems, stability in differential games, the study of systems with multirate time and other. Articles prepared specially for this edition.
The paper proposes a list of requirements for a game able to describe individually motivated social interactions: be non-cooperative, able to construct multiple coalitions in an equilibrium and incorporate intra and inter coalition externalities. For this purpose the paper presents a family of non-cooperative games for coalition structure construction with an equilibrium existence theorem for a game in the family. Few examples illustrate the approach. One of the results is that efficiency is not equivalent to cooperation as an allocation in one coalition. Further papers will demonstrate other applications of the approach.
Mathematical models of nonlinear systems of a certain class allow them represented as linear systems with nonlinear state feedback. In other words, let make the appropriate coordinate transformation of the original dynamic model. Such a transformation, using Lyapunov functions, a number of studies used to determine the parameters of regulators to ensure the asymptotic stability properties of the nonlinear system, ie guaranteeing bounded trajectories emanating from the initial states of the system. For linear systems, there is a powerful and convenient mathematical apparatus allows the synthesis of optimal controls, but this unit is not applicable or partially applicable for nonlinear systems. Unlike prior work in this paper for nonlinear systems linearizable feedback as in the synthesis of optimal control problems with quadratic performance applied the method based on the use of the Riccati equation with parameters depending on the state.
The collecton contains paper accepted for the Seventh International Conference Game theory and Management (June 26-28, 2013, St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia). The presented papers belong to the field of game theory and its application to mamagement.
The volume may be recommended for researchers and post-graduate students of management, economic and applied mathematics departments.
Sited and reviewed in: Math-Net.Ru and RSCI. Abstracted and indexed in: Mathematical Reviews, Zentralblatt MATH and VINITI.
In the present paper the game theory is applied to an important open question in economics: providing microfoundations for often-used types of production function. Simple differential games of bargaining are proposed to model a behavior of workers and capital-owners in processes of formation of a set of admissible factor prices or participants’ weights (moral-ethical assessments). These games result, correspondingly, in a factor price curve and a weight curve – structures dual to production function. Ultimately, under constant bargaining powers of the participants, the Cobb-Douglas production function is received.
This book is devoted to game theory and its applications to environmental problems, economics, and management. It collects contributions originating from the 12th International Conference on “Game Theory and Management” 2018 (GTM2018) held at Saint Petersburg State University, Russia, from 27 to 29 June 2018.
A new approach is proposed revealing duality relations between a physical side of economy (resources and technologies) and its institutional side (institutional relationsd between social groups). Production function is modeled not as a primal object but rather as a secondary one defined in a dual way by the institutional side. Differential games of bargaining are proposed to model a behavior of workers and capitalists in process of prices or weights formation. These games result, correspondingly, in a price curve and in a weight curve - structures dual to a production function. Ultimately, under constant bargaining powers of the participants, the Cobb-Douglas production function is generated.