Регулирование тарифов в газовом комплексе России
A game theory approach to analyzing the competitiveness of tariffs on transit container transportation via railroads is proposed. In the framework of the proposed approach the analysis is implemented by solving (finding saddle points in) two games on polyhedral sets of connected strategies of the players with the payoff function being a sum of two linear functions of vector arguments. When Russian Railways compete against all its competitors, finding competitive tariffs and a fair share of the market of transit container transportation is reducible to solving two auxiliary quadratic programming problems. When Russian Railways partners (forms a coalition) with any of its competitors, finding the saddle point of the game is reducible to solving systems of quadratic inequalities.
The proposed approach allows Russian Railways develop substantiated recommendations on changing tariffs, determined by the 10-01 Russian regulation, not only for transit container transportation, but for all railroad freight transportation in Russia.
The article is devoted to the long-term regulation of rail freight tariffs proposed in the order of the FAS Russia. The process of indexation of tariffs in 2017 and 2018 is described and calculation of indexation of tariffs for 2019-2023 is made on the basis of the FAS methodology and inflation forecasts
The article is dedicated to the work of S.Yu. Witte by rail. The period of his work in the joint-stock company of the South-Western Railways, his journalistic and expert activity in the railway field at this time is considered. The article provides an overview of Witte’s views on the system of railway freight tariffs formulated in his book Principles of Railway Tariffs for the Carriage of Goods (1883) and analyzed his views on the private and government railway facilities
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.