Мониторинг экономики образования
The paper deals with an up-to-date problem related to improvement of effective education in the terms of transition of teaching staff of the higher-educational system to effective contract. A number of models for assessment of teaching efficiency of scientific-teachіng staff of higher educational institutions are proposed. A role of the up-to-date educational technologies in the improvement of quality of the higher professional education is shown.
The article presents the current practices of system of remuneration for university teaching staff in higher educational institutions in Russia. The research was based on 51 in-depth interviews in the 6 universities and included the analysis of 100 universities’ local acts of the wage system. The main question of the article is: what are the differences in the remuneration systems in the 6 higher education institutions and why these differences occur. We claim that the universities’ remuneration systems are formed under the impact of 4 factors: 1) external formal accountability to the federal and regional governments; 2) strategic goals of the university (which are often formed as a university response to external accountability); 3) the financial resources of the university; 4) its internal features: the number of university teaching staff, centralized or decentralized management, the number of departments of the university and its’ profiles.
Institutions affect investment decisions, including investments in human capital. Hence institutions are relevant for the allocation of talent. Good market-supporting institutions attract talent to productive value-creating activities, whereas poor ones raise the appeal of rent-seeking. We propose a theoretical model that predicts that more talented individuals are particularly sensitive in their career choices to the quality of institutions, and test these predictions on a sample of around 95 countries of the world. We find a strong positive association between the quality of institutions and graduation of college and university students in science, and an even stronger negative correlation with graduation in law. Our findings are robust to various specifications of empirical models, including smaller samples of former colonies and transition countries. The quality of human capital makes the distinction between educational choices under strong and weak institutions particularly sharp. We show that the allocation of talent is an important link between institutions and growth.