Proceedings, Fourteenth International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR-14)
The KR Conference series is a leading forum for timely in- depth presentation of progress in the theory and principles underlying the representation and computational management of knowledge. The 2014 KR conference was held as part of the Vienna Summer of Logic, a consortium of 12 conferences and 82 workshops organized by the Kurt Gödel Society at the Vienna University of Technology.
We investigate conjunctive query inseparability of description logic (DL) knowledge bases (KBs) with respect to a given signature, a fundamental problem for KB versioning, module extraction, forgetting and knowledge exchange. We study the data and combined complexity of deciding KB query inseparability for fragments of Horn-ALCHI, including the DLs underpinning OWL 2 QL and OWL 2 EL. While all of these DLs are P-complete for data complexity, the combined complexity ranges from P to EXPTIME and 2EXPTIME. We also resolve two major open problems for OWL 2 QL by showing that TBox query inseparability and the membership problem for universal UCQ-solutions in knowledge exchange are both EXPTIME-complete for combined complexity.
Boolean games are an expressive and natural formalism through which to investigate problems of strategic interaction in multiagent systems. Although they have been widely studied, almost all previous work on Nash equilibria in Boolean games has focused on the restricted setting of pure strategies. This is a shortcoming as finite games are guaranteed to have at least one equilibrium in mixed strategies, but many simple games fail to have pure strategy equilibria at all. We address this by showing that a natural decision problem about mixed equilibria: determining whether a Boolean game has a mixed strategy equilibrium that guarantees every player a given payoff, is NEXP-hard. Accordingly, the epsilon variety of the problem is NEXP-complete. The proof can be adapted to show coNEXP-hardness of a similar question: whether all Nash equilibria of a Boolean game guarantee every player at least the given payoff.