Сёрл в Москве: фрагменты события
The collective monograph, «Langage, pensée et esprit» ("Language, mind and spirit") published in French, presents the outcome of an international research project conducted during the years 2012-2015 by an international group of experts in contemporary philosophy of language and Wittgenstein scholars. The co-authors represent the following universities: University of Bergen, Norway; Université Paris-8 Vincennes Saint-Denis, France; National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia; and Université de Tunis. The monograph examines diverse aspects of L. Wittgenstein's philosophy of language that are of considerable importance for today's philosophy of mind and for the epistemology of contemporary social sciences.
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason aims to determine boundaries of reason. Reason is a
faculty of the soul. But Kant does not deal explicitly with the question what a faculty of the soul itself may be. The dissertation construes Kant’s implicit notion of a mental faculty in relation to psychological debates in 17th and 18th century Germany. It can be shown that Kant agreed with Christian August Crusius in that faculties are real properties, an assumption that was denied by Christian Wolff. This poses a problem which is fundamental for understanding Kant’s project: How can we have knowledge of mental faculties at all? If knowledge of faculties was empirical for Kant, it would belong to psychology rather than to epistemology which, according to Kant, must not rely on empirical facts. In order to find out whether there can be knowledge a priori about mental faculties, the book provides a close reading of relevant passages from published texts and other sources (lecture transcripts, Reflexionen). The final result is negative: Kant has no conclusive argument for the real existence of mental faculties. Nevertheless, an awareness of Kant’s unwritten “metaphysics of the mental” is essential for understanding implicit premisses of Kant’s thought.
This paper considers the theory of objects of Alexius Meinong (1853–1920) in the light of discussions between himself and Bertrand Russell at the beginning of XX century. Meinong’s conception has made significant contribution into the problem of nonexistent objects that still remains one of the most debated in contemporary philosophy. Here author aims to show how theory of objects as such came into being and how its main ideas were discussed and criticized in subsequent philosophical thought.
The article deals with the clauses or preconditions of language and culture acquisition. Following G. G. Shpet, A. A. Uchtomsky, M. Heidegger, N. A. Bernshtein and V. V. Bibikhin, the author qualifies them as «pre-experiential origin». This «origin» is regarded as direct intelligible intuition, spiritual integral, non-differentiated unity: I understand, I think, I can. Spontaneous character of this origin does not mean its primitiveness. Non-mediated pre-experiential origin develops in its differentiation that comes to life in joint activity, in interflowing communication giving birth to multiple forms of culture-mediated behavior. Development of these forms hampers perception and understanding of the world in its immediacy but also enriches these acts. Interchange and interaction of the immediate and the mediated is regarded as a necessary condition of human development and productive activity. The author questions the idea of division psychological functions into natural and cultural (higher), assumed in cultural-historical psychology.