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Article

Спор о беспредметных представлениях (Б. Больцано, К. Твардовский, Э. Гуссерль)

This article discusses the problem of the so-called objectless presentations, which was largely discussed within Austrian philosophy of the 19th century. Our analysis is concentrated on the evolution of understanding and status of objectless presentations in works of three main authors of this tradition: The Theory of Science by B. Bolzano, On Content and Object of Presentations by K. Twardowski and Intentional Objects by E. Husserl. For the first time the thesis on objectless presentations was offered by Bolzano (1837), who gave precise characteristics to objects, which do not correspond to any type of presentation. Later, Bolzanos ideas were reactualized by Twardowski (1894). Logical and psychological study of the latter was mainly based on his interpretation of Brentanos conception, and particularly on his own understanding of intentionality. Twardowski in his investigations wrote about a necessity of special differentiation between the content of presentation and the immanent object, where the latter was considered as intentional and real. Thus, from Twardowskis point of view, the idea of objectless presentations is based on a visible mistake: nonexistence of an object is always confused with its nonbeing presented. Also the matter of exceptional importance is his analysis of the notion nothing. This notion was originally brought into the discussion by Bernard Bolzano, who used it as an example of objectless presentation. As an answer to this Twardowski presented the logical analysis of nothing and proved that it (in terms of Mills logic) is not a name, or, in other words, it is not a categorematic, but syncategorematic expression. Husserls essay in some way finishes this discussion. Here we should pay attention to the problem of the context Husserl was writing his work (1894) in. Intentional Objects was the first work Husserl did not write in the tradition of Brentanos descriptive psychology. Under the influence of Frege and Bolzano, Husserl becomes a radical critic of psychologism, and, of course, he successfully ridiculed the thing as an assumption of existence of such essences as content of presentation. Accordingly, as he took up the position of logicism he sharply criticized various attempts of assuming the real existence of those things, which are logically impossible. Thus, we can note, that this analysis allows us to find out the key opposition, which characterizes philosophy of those times: the opposition of psychologism and logicism.