Сохранение контроля над публичной компанией через выпуск акций с разными правами голоса. «За» и «против» избыточных прав на контроль
The aim of this review is to classify research papers on major vs. minor shareholders conflicts and ownership concentration. These issues are closely related both to each other and to manager vs. owner conflicts. Ownership concentration is property distribution among shareholders. Ownership concentration studies consider the following questions: how many major and minor shareholders are there in the company; how many inside shareholders are there and if they are minor or major; in what way concentration influences performance of the company; what costs are associated with major vs. minor shareholders conflicts etc. The bond between ownership concentration and manager vs. owner conflict is due to the fact that often managers are major shareholders along with other owners. In such cases incentive hypothesis, entranchement hypothesis, monitoring and control costs, as well as their effect on performance, should be considered together.
The institute of investment operations guarantees is designed to ensure, through legal measures, a relative stability of reproduction and freedom of capital movement in the world economic system amid the backdrop of social, economic and political crisis. The notion of investment guarantee stands for the investment insurance mechanism both on the state and the state-by-state basis, aimed at compensation for damages caused to a foreign investor upon occurrence of events economically affecting the investment. The article discusses the activity of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) established under the Seoul Convention. MIGA's guarantee opportunities, conditions for granting investment guarantees and risks which could be covered by the Agency's guarantees are specified.