Коммунизм и фашизм: два тоталитарных монстра?
We address the external effects on public sector efficiency measures acquired using Data Envelopment Analysis. We use the health care system in Russian regions in 2011 to evaluate modern approaches to accounting for external effects. We propose a promising method of correcting DEA efficiency measures. Despite the multiple advantages DEA offers, the usage of this approach carries with it a number of methodological difficulties. Accounting for multiple factors of efficiency calls for more complex methods, among which the most promising are DMU clustering and calculating local production possibility frontiers. Using regression models for estimate correction requires further study due to possible systematic errors during estimation. A mixture of data correction and DMU clustering together with multi-stage DEA seems most promising at the moment. Analyzing several stages of transforming society’s resources into social welfare will allow for picking out the weak points in a state agency’s work.
This paper is devoted to the explanation of selected bureaus’ behavior patterns in the soviet type of totalitarian dictatorships with the command economic model. It is a proven fact that the plan figures in the soviet economy were fabricated as a consequence of intrigues and secret negotiations between different interested parties. Generally, bureaus, as rational agents that minimize risk and maximize slack, should have been interested in reducing the plan figures, nevertheless, they strived to increase them. As examples, mass repression under dictatorships and overexpenditure of an administrative leverage at elections in non-democratic and quasi-democratic countries can be observed. In the article we develop a simple model of coordination between principal (dictator) and his agents (bureaus), which explain the mentioned paradoxical situation.
Volume is devoted to a wide range of issues of history and modern foreign countries.
This article is devoted to the Digest of the Laws of the Russian Empire – an embodiment of the operative legal system in late imperial Russia. Even though the Digest contained the law in force, and thus should be studied as a crucial source on Russian (legal) history, its meaning has been often overlooked. The reason for that is a remarkable difference between the original texts of laws adopted by the legislator, and their published form in the Digest. This difference came from the necessary editing procedures when every new piece of legislation was included in the existing system of the Digest. This strange feature of legal procedure when two different versions of a particular law – the original one and the one codified in the Digest – both remained in force should be considered as a part of official autocratic legality in late imperial Russia. Even though it may seem inefficient and irrational, the practice of obligatory codification of laws in the Digest existed for a rather long time – from 1835 until 1917. My research aims to find possible explanations for the Digest’s prolonged existence in the context of political and legal culture of late imperial Russia. What did Russian ‘official legality’ actually mean on the levels of theory and action?