This paper is devoted to the rational behavior in the sense of the educational level choice. The theoretical model is based on the discounted flow of personal’s utility function covered the period of the education and future work. Maximizing the flow under the budget constraint we received differential equation included the rate of income grow after the acquisition of education. The solution is the Mincerian type equation. The main result of the model is that the persons with rapid growth of their earnings profile should have the smaller slope coefficients of schooling in the earnings equation. The empirical part of the research is based on the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) data set. The theoretical results have been confirmed by the regression analysis. Splitting the RLMS sample according to the respondents’ wage profiles we received that highly educated agents unlike the unskilled workers have higher income but slighter slope earnings profiles. It means that the workers expected the high growth of their incomes after the schooling are less inclined to receive higher level of education. Otherwise the persons who expected high income on the job start justify their hopes, but come across the low growth of the incomes.
The collective monograph includes practical and theoretical materials on the questions of innovation activity in the system of education.
Тhе article is devoted to the analysis of science, education and business as key institutional agents of civil identity in contemporary society. The civil identity is specified as a subject-object interaction between an individual and a state. Also preconditions for diversification of state power in the field of civic identity forming are determined.