Инновационный потенциал сектора интеллектуальных услуг в России
Форсайт. 2011. Т. 5. № 4. С. 50-65.
Дорошенко М. Е.
Doroshenko M. E., Miles I. D., Vinogradov D. Science, Technology and Innovation. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2013. No. 12.
Knowledge Intensive Business Services (KIBS) are widely argued to be important actors in innovation systems. They are active both innovating themselves, and by providing their clients with important knowledge and learning opportunities. This study uses survey data to investigate the mechanisms of knowledge transfer and innovativeness improvement through the provision of KIBS. The empirical core of the paper is a set of Russian surveys of KIBS and their clients: KIBS are a fairly new phenomenon in Russia, so this provides an opportunity to contrast KIBS supplier-client relationships featuring more and less experienced customers. Many of the KIBS firms’ services are highly tailored to customer specificities, and we consider how far this is minor customisation and how far novel products (and thus potentially product innovations) are involved. These services typically involve KIBS consumers into a coproduction process, where both the formal supplier and the formal user of the service are engaged together in service production. Knowledge transfers through learning-by-doing in such cases affect customers' propensity to innovate and improve their absorptive capacity. The paper concludes that the generation of innovations through KIBS may well be a self-sustaining process. In this process, service providers are incentivised to engage in service innovations by more innovative customers’ demand for highly individualised services. In turn, the process stimulates the innovativeness of customers, as they engage in learning-by-doing through coproduction.
Added: Jul 12, 2013
Дорошенко М. Е., Березин И. С., Виноградов Д. В. и др. М.: Беловодье, 2010.
Added: Dec 19, 2012
Шадриков В. Д. В кн.: Федеральный справочник. Образование в России (информационно-аналитическое издание). Т. 8: Центр стратегического партнерства. М.: Центр стратегического партнерства, 2011. С. 333-336.
Added: Dec 9, 2012
Боговиз А. В., Кожевина О. В. Вестник Университета (Государственный университет управления). 2012. № 12. С. 145-150.
Added: Mar 21, 2013
Проблемы современной экономики: сборник материалов III Международной научно-практической конференции: в 2-х частях
Марковская Е. И. Ч. 1. Новосибирск: НГТУ, 2011.
Added: Mar 19, 2013
Vinogradov D., Shadrina E. V., Doroshenko M. E. Public Administration. PA. Высшая школа экономики, 2015. No. WP BRP 27/PA/2015.
Knowledge intensive business services (KIBS) constitute a rapidly developing sector of modern economies. Numerous studies suggest that KIBS facilitate knowledge exchange between providers and consumers, and improve the innovativeness of the latter. However, because KIBS are strongly reliant on service co-production by the customer and provider working in partnership, intensive cooperation between the two parties is essential. Public procurement may provide supporting mechanisms for this sector, both directly (by purchasing services) and indirectly (by demonstrating the benefits of KIBS consumption, which may stimulate the demand for them from the private sector). Yet legislative constraints on the types of admissible public procurement mechanisms may have an undesirable effect on the provider selection, making it possible that services are purchased not from the most efficient or the most suitable provider. Along with that, public bodies are known to be managerially less efficient than private firms, partly due to a distorted system of incentives. These key differences between the public and private sectors motivated us to study the efficiency of public procurement of KIBS. In particular, we find that consumers of KIBS in the public sector report lower satisfaction from KIBS and admit a lower level of co-production than the private sector. Our main recommendations refer to the optimal choice of procurement mechanisms and the system of incentives in public institutions
Added: Apr 29, 2015
The Impact of Coproducing Services with Clients on Knowledge-Intensive Business Services' Innovativeness
Chichkanov N. Science, Technology and Innovation. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2019. No. 100.
Despite the growing interest to the field of coproduction from the service-dominant logic literature, this concept is still being emerging and most of the existing papers do not provide any empirical evidence. The aim of the study is to investigate whether those KIBS firms that involve their customers in coproduction of services are more innovative. This paper explores the relationships between a set of innovation drivers and implementation of innovations in KIBS based on a sample of 441 firms operating in Russia. The results show that coproduction of services increases the possibility of both technological and non-technological innovations in KIBS to be implemented. This finding suggests that in addition to the service offerings quality improvement, coproduction of KIBS also acts as an innovation driver, which requires an attention from innovation managers.
Added: Dec 15, 2019
Агабеков С. И., Левина Е. А. Финансы и бизнес. 2012. № 4. С. 57-72.
Added: Jan 24, 2013
Влияние кластеров на инновационную активность предприятий в субъектах РФ: результаты эмпирического исследования
Куценко Е. С. В кн.: XII Международная научная конференция по проблемам развития экономики и общества. В четырех книгах. Книга 4.. Кн. 4. М.: Издательский дом НИУ ВШЭ, 2012. С. 495-504.
Added: Jul 3, 2013
Added: Dec 19, 2012
Липатников В. С., Лобас А. С. В кн.: Экономика и управление: Сборник научных трудов. Ч. 3. СПб.: Издательство СПбГУЭФ, 2012. С. 44-51.
Added: Mar 25, 2013
Экономика и управление: проблемы и перспективы развития. Сборник научных статей по итогам международной научно-практической конференции г.Волгоград 15-16 ноября 2010 г.
Ч. 1. Волгоград: Волгоградское научное издательство, 2010.
Added: Jan 18, 2013
Anisimova A. I., Muradyan P. A., Vernikov A. V. SSRN Working Paper Series. Social Science Research Network, 2011. No. 1919817.
This empirical paper adds to competition and industrial organization literature by exploring the interplay between industry structure and competitiveness on local, rather than nation-wide, markets. We use micro-level statistical data for banks in two Russian regions (Bashkortostan and Tatarstan) to estimate Herfindahl-Hirschman index, Lerner index, and Panzar-Rosse model. We estimate Panzar-Rosse model in two ways: via the widely used price-equation that accounts for scale effects and then via a revenue-equation that disregards scale effects as suggested by Bikker et al. (2009). We find both regional markets to be ruled by monopolistic competition, although estimation by revenue-equation does not reject monopoly hypothesis for Tatarstan. Existence of sizeable locally-owned and operated institutions does not necessarily lead to higher competitiveness of the given regional market, and the results from non-structural methods of estimation suggest that bank competition in Bashkortostan is stronger than in Tatarstan. Going further away from aggregated analysis we compute Lerner indices in two product segments of Tatarstan – retail and corporate loans – and find that retail segment is significantly more competitive. Local banks exert more market power in corporate loans, while federal branches – in retail loans.
Added: May 14, 2012
Added: Feb 22, 2013
Трунин П. В., Дробышевский С. М., Евдокимова Т. В. М.: Издательский дом «Дело» РАНХиГС, 2012.
Added: Mar 26, 2013
Яковлев А. А. Общественные науки и современность. 2008. № 4. С. 21-37.
Added: Sep 22, 2012
Penikas H. I. Financial Economics. FE. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. No. 03.
The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision initiated a discussion on the most efficient practices to prevent bank managers from excessive risk-taking. This paper proposes a game-theoretical approach, describing the decision-making process by a bank manager who chooses his own level of risk and effort. If the level of risk implies the variability of the future outcome, the amount of effort applied affects the probability of a positive outcome. Although effort is unobserved for the bank’s stakeholders, the risk level is under control, and is associated with certain indicators such as capital adequacy ratio or leverage level. The risk-neutral utility function of a bank manager and a binary game outcome of gaining profit or loss for a bank are assumed. Starting from the general incentive contract scheme having the fixed and variable parts of remuneration, it is proposed that differentiating the variable part of remuneration is sufficient to motivate bank managers to make fewer risky decisions. More precisely, the variable part of remuneration (e.g. the share of the bank’s profit) needs to be higher in proportion to the higher variance of outcome for the high -risk outcome case to stimulate a bank manager to opt for lower-risk decisions in place of higher-risk situations.
Added: May 3, 2012
Уринсон Я. М. Вестник Европы. 2014. № 38-39.
Added: Feb 5, 2018
Penikas H. I., Titova Y. Financial Economics. FE. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. No. 02.
In this paper we elaborate a simple model that allows for the predicting of possible reactions from financial institutions to more stringent regulatory measures introduced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in regard to global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). The context is framed by a 2011 BCBS document that proposes higher capital requirements for global systemically important banks. We attempt to analyze bank interactions in an oligopolistic market that is subject to demand constraints on loan amounts and additional loss absorbency requirements introduced by the regulator. We distinguish between the bank’s announced funding cost that determines both the loan amount issued and the market interest rate, and the bank’s true funding cost that has a direct impact on retained earnings. We conclude that in a two-stage game both banks will announce the highest funding cost, thus reducing the amount of loans granted (in line with the regulator’s objective), but at the expense of a higher cost of borrowing established in the market. If the game is repeated, then both banks also choose lower loan amounts in the periods prior to the last one in which the declared funding cost is the lowest possible. It should be noted that the designated outcome also coincides with the findings of the Monetary Economic Department of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
Added: May 3, 2012
Added: Jun 24, 2011