Bank Depositor Behavior in Russia in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis
An international team of economists examines the factors influencing the behavior of Russian depositors in the immediate aftermath of that country’s 1998 financial crisis, drawing upon two largely unutilized data sources—data from the Russian state savings bank Sberbank and a November 1998 household survey. After first reviewing the evolution of the household deposit market during the 1990s, they explore regional variations in net withdrawals from Sberbank branches during the period August–October 1998 as well as identify characteristics of individual/household depositors making (or attempting to make) such withdrawals. More severe runs on Sberbank outlets are found to be associated with more affluent and entrepreneurial regions, regions of more youthful and less educated population closer to Moscow, and areas with greater media freedom. Subsequent public opinion survey analysis of the socioeconomic correlates of runs on all Russian banks during the 1998 crisis reveals some interesting differences (in the effects of education in particular) on the propensity to successfully withdraw deposits.
Bank stabilization measures adopted by the Russian authorities since 2008 have benefited core state-owned financial institutions to a greater extent than other market participants. Public sector keeps swelling at the expense of domestic private sector. According to the author’s methodology, by January 2010 state-controlled banks possessed over 50 percent of all bank assets, thus putting Russia in the same league with China and India. Development banking and policy lending expand. A feature distinguishing Russia is gradual substitution of direct state control by indirect state ownership in the shape of corporate pyramids headed by state-owned enterprises and state-owned banks. We construct a dataset of bank-level statistical data for the period between 2001 and 2010 and find that quasi-private banks (indirectly state-owned banks) were the fastest growing subgroup. Nationalization and rehabilitation of failed banks was carried out by state-controlled banks and entities rather than by federal executive authorities directly. We suggest that the response of the Russian authorities to bank instability was consistent with long-term trends in the banking system evolution. Anti-crisis measures of 2008-9 re-aligned the sector with the traditional model of banking that rests upon dominant state-owned banks, directed lending, protectionism, administrative interference and elements of price controls. Increased government ownership of banks and control over lending activity are unlikely to be fully dismantled after the crisis is over. This scenario can nevertheless accommodate a tactical retreat of the state from non-core assets in the financial sector, leaving control over 3 largest institutions intact.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the size of public sector within the Russian banking industry. We identify and classify at least 78 state-influenced banks. We distinguish between banks that are majority-owned by federal executive authorities or Central Bank of Russia, by sub-federal (regional and municipal) authorities, by state-owned enterprises and banks, and by "state corporations". We estimate their combined market share to have reached 56% of total assets by July 1, 2009. Banks indirectly owned by public capital are the fastest-growing group. Concentration is increasing within the public sector of the industry, with the top five state-controlled banking groups in possession of over 49% of assets. We observe a crowding out and erosion of domestic private capital, whose market share is shrinking from year to year. Several of the largest state-owned banks now constitute a de facto intermediate tier at the core of the banking system. We argue that the direction of ownership change in Russian banking is different from that in CEE countries.
The paper examines corporate governance and control in Russian banks. We focus on real interests of stakeholders – bank regulators, owners, investors, and top managers. Anglo-American concept of corporate governance, based on agency theory and implying outside investors’ control over banks through stock market, is found to bear limited relevance.
This paper represents an empirical examination of the process of banks' growth in Russia during 2004-2010 years. A Stochastic process of growth is modeled by Markov chain theory. Elements in the transition matrices of Markov Chain are the transition probabilities that provide a plausible estimate of how the banking system structure changes from one period to another. markov chain stationarity check revealed three homogeneous periods. Given adequate robustness proof forecasting for 1, 3, and 10 years ahead was done. it is argues number of banks is expected to decrease mostly two times whereas total assets are envisaged to grow more than 2.5 times, but return on assets is unlikely to increase more than by 12% in 10 years by 2020.
The process of the IPO of banks in Russia is its infancy but the rapid growth is forecasted. This context raises the issue of the factors determining the floated banks stock value. The results of the research on 2007-2009 Russian data showed that the bank stock price is dependent on the macroeconomic indicators (such as the oil prices and the Dow Jones index volatility) and the some banking system indicators(the interbank interest rate, the bank’s ROA, and ROE). However, the results adjusted to the global financial crisis effect proved to exclude the ROE factor and showed the dependence of the stocks prices of the floated banks from the historic trend of the American economy. The models developed are of the practical application and can be used by the institutional as well as the private investors.
The purpose of this paper is to carefully assess the size of public sector within the Russian banking industry. We identify and classify at least 78 state-influenced banks. For the state-owned banks, we distinguish between those that are majority-owned by federal executive authorities or Central Bank of Russia, by sub-federal (regional and municipal) authorities, by state-owned enterprises and banks, and by "state corporations". We estimate their combined market share to have reached 56% of total assets by July 1, 2009. Banks indirectly owned by public capital are the fastest-growing group. Concentration is increasing within the public sector of the industry, with the top five state-controlled banking groups in possession of over 49% of assets. We observe a crowding out and erosion of domestic private capital, whose market share is shrinking from year to year. Several of the largest state-owned banks now constitute a de facto intermediate tier at the core of the banking system. We argue that the direction of ownership change in Russian banking is different from that in CEE countries.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
This paper uses the banking industry case to show that the boundaries of public property in Russia are blurred. A messy state withdrawal in 1990s left publicly funded assets beyond direct reach of official state bodies. While we identify no less than 50 state-owned banks in a broad sense, the federal government and regional authorities directly control just 4 and 12 institutions, respectively. 31 banks are indirectly state-owned, and their combined share of state-owned banks’ total assets grew from 11% to over a quarter between 2001 and 2010. The state continues to bear financial responsibility for indirectly owned banks, while it does not benefit properly from their activity through dividends nor capitalization nor policy lending. Such banks tend to act as quasi private institutions with weak corporate governance. Influential insiders (top-managers, current and former civil servants) and cronies extract their rent from control over financial flows and occasional appropriation of parts of bank equity.