Dynamic modeling of the impact of socio-economic restrictions and behavior on COVID-19 outbreak
The COVID-19 pandemic had an enormous social and economic impact on societies
in 2020. The epidemiological situation is evolving on a daily basis, and the methodology
of how to evaluate the impact of the pandemic and the severity of its consequences
is lacking. The only available high-frequency data now are the number of
people who have contracted the illness, and the restrictive measures that authorities
have implemented to contain the outbreak. The most important question now
is whether authorities can prevent subsequent waves. The contribution of the paper
is a dynamic model of COVID-19 outbreaks, on the basis of which we investigated
the possible impact of the socio-economic behavior and restrictions on its waves.
To build the model, a large database for different countries with a wide range of
economic and social institutions was collected. We give a detailed description of
the model and a comparison of the results with trajectories of the outbreaks in the
countries under consideration. The proposed model describes the empirical results
and can be used for timely and contemporary predictions of the stages of pandemics.
Despite this, the model needs future development and verification because the
pandemic is not over, and the accumulation of empirical information continues. Yet
the model might also be useful as a basis for researching the impacts of other socioeconomic
and medical actions for containing pandemics.
Analysis of the spread of infections has repeatedly confirmed the importance of the geographical location of countries. Despite the recognized role of economic weights in modeling spatial effects, the applicability of non-geographic weight matrices to investigating the spread of coronavirus has not been sufficiently studied. This work, based on data from 155 countries of the world, has shown that considering spatial autocorrelation from the point of view of trade turnover expands the understanding of the nature of the spread of the virus, but cannot replace the analysis of geographic weight matrices.
Basel III proposes market discipline (banking disclosure requirements) as a key instrument to achieve soundness in the banking system. Consequently, it is necessary to test the presence of responses to bank risk on the part of the economic agents. This article empirically studies the mechanisms of market discipline (price, quantity, and maturity) in the interbank market: whether higher risk banks have to pay higher interest rates, and have less access to credit in the interbank market, especially for long maturity borrowing. Theoretically, bankers are well equipped to monitor other banks, but the interbank market also is a channel for contagion. Using a sample of 37 Mexican banks, from December 2008 to September 2012, and a dynamic panel model (SYS GMM estimator), I did not find evidence for discipline induced by peers.
The Oxford Compendium of National Legal Responses to Covid-19 is a global academic collaboration mapping legal responses to Covid-19 in dozens of participating countries and territories. Each entry is structured identically and explores the role of public law, institutional adaptation, public health measures, social and labour policy, and human rights measures introduced or applied as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic. The entries are updated periodically across 2021. The Oxford Compendium is the primary output of the Lex-Atlas: Covid-19 project.
In this paper we study the existence of a speculative bubble in the prices of the Russian telecommunications companies in the late 1990-s. In the study we use the regime-switching-type of econometric test that diagnoses the explosive pattern in the stock prices. Tests that compare series of prices and dividends are not applicable because most of the Russian quoted telecom companies did not pay dividends at that time. The tests did not reject the hypothesis of the existence of the bubble in the prices of shares of all Russian telecommunication companies except one and in the index of the Russian telecoms. The existence of the bubble was confirmed by the presence of its indirect indicators, namely rapid price growth and abnormal cumulative return before the price peak, too optimistic perception of news related to telecoms, deep correction and lengthy recovery after the crash. From 1998 to 2000 the prices of the Russian telecom companies grew in line with the Russian stock market, the correlation coefficient being 0,95. The telecoms index broke away from the general stock market only in the 1Q of 2000. We also tested whether the bubble in the Russian telecommunication companies stock market was a result of contagion from the NASDAQ market or it was caused by the revival of the Russian stock market after the 1998 crisis. The same was studied with respect to the crash of the bubble. We analyzed the dynamics of the correlation coefficients between the markets. This methodology implies that the markets become more interdependent and the contagion takes place if the correlation increases after the shock. No contagion effect was diagnosed. The indirect indication of the fact that no contagion took place is the date of the peak of the Russian telecoms index. It was reached 19 days after the NASDAQ peak. The speculative bubble on the Russian telecommunication stock market was determined by the events in the Russian stock market, but was influenced by news and attitudes toward telecommunications stocks in the USA.
Recovering from Covid: Responsible Management and Reshaping the Economy
In 2021, the 35th Conference and 2nd BAM Conference in the Cloud, will critically engage with the socio-economic recovery from the global Covid-19 pandemic.
Consumers, producers, frontline workers, managers, businesses, public and third sector organisations all have their own roles and responsibilities in transforming our marketised society for the post-pandemic world.
We will critically explore the challenges we all face, aiming to generate relevant, impactful insights into the innovative forms and means of mobilising the collective action that is required if we are to create a productive, flourishing and more inclusive society.
The devastation created by the Covid-19 pandemic presents a unique opportunity for the business and management academy to play its part in addressing the social, technical, economic and environmental disruptions we face. There is a desperate need for responsible management and distributed leadership.
These unique circumstances offer the ability to make a tangible difference beyond the realms of the theoretical and academic, to take chances we might not otherwise have encountered. We call upon our collaborative research community to address the broad range of questions the pandemic and its aftermath have created, to explore how best to reimagine and enable a greener, more sustainable economy, one that levels up the economy, and one that is both inclusive and fairer.
The Russian Federation is a vast country with a population of 144 million primarily concentrated in a small number of urban agglomerations, among which Moscow and Saint Petersburg are the largest and most densely populated. The massive Covid-19 outbreak in Russia began in Moscow in March 2020 and reached all 85 constituent units by mid-April 2020. The major cities (mainly Moscow and Saint Petersburg) accounted for the largest number of cases throughout all waves of the pandemic. As of 1 August 2021, the Russian authorities have reported the total number of over 6.2 million cases of Covid-19 in Russia, including 1.5 million cases in Moscow and over 530,000 cases in Saint Petersburg, which has resulted in 160,000 deaths over the course of the pandemic.1 The spread of the coronavirus in Russia has progressed in three major waves: the first wave reaching its peak in May 2020 with around 10,000 new cases a day, the second—more aggressive—reaching the official maximum of 29,000 new cases daily in December 2020, and the third wave—caused by the Delta variant of the virus—starting in June 2021 and still at its peak at the time of writing. During the peaks, the public health system was overwhelmed, especially in federated units remote from the country’s capital. Depending on the severity of the pandemic, the federal and regional governments invoked and eased various public health restrictions under the regime of high alert. This report contains a detailed overview of the organization of public power on the national and subnational levels in Russia, and a variety of responses to the Covid-19 crisis offered at various stages of the pandemic.
What is the relationship between the two largest emerging financial markets of Eastern Europe, Russia and Poland, and how do they impact the region’s stock markets? The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of these two countries in regional volatility by examining their effect on two separate phenomena: financial volatility, defined here as long-term interrelations, and contagion, a more short-term phenomenon. Utilizing bivariate DCC-GARCH modeling, this paper estimates long-term volatility spillover effects and short-term contagion effects and their origins during several periods of financial crisis in the Central and Eastern European region. Our results show that the long-term impact of volatility in the Russian market is much more substantial than that of Poland in Central and Eastern Europe, with this disparate impact corresponding to each country’s level of market capitalization. Additionally, our results show that Russia served as a source of short-term contagion for neighboring countries during its banking crisis in 2004 and during the Russian stock market fall in 2008. Poland had comparatively less effect on the region during the Global Financial Crisis. Moreover, the entrance of Poland into the European Union in May 2004 had no impact on stock markets in the region in terms of enhancing contagion.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.