Пост-шоковый рост российской экономики. Опыт кризисов 1998 и 2008 гг. и взгляд в будущее
The global economy is in recession due to the pandemic of the coronavirus infection COVID-19. According to available estimates, Russia's GDP in 2020 will fall by 2–8%, so that in its consequences the current crisis may be tougher than the crises of 1998 and 2008. In the coming years, the Russian economy will have to recover and enter a new long-term growth path. At what expense and in which industries will this happen?
The report based on the experience of previous crises using industry accounts of economic growth and Russia KLEMS data, examined possible sources of recovery of the Russian economy after the crisis of 2020. By analogy with the recovery after 2008, it is likely to be associated with increased demand for raw materials on world markets and the reaction of the Russian oil and gas complex. Stagnation after 2008 is due to a decrease in production efficiency, especially in the expanded mining complex, as well as the cessation of technological make-up. Growth stimulation measures should include finding ways to increase the efficiency of the expanded mining complex, stimulating the adaptation of advanced technologies, and preserving existing adaptation channels in times of crisis - for example, successful export-oriented industries integrated into global value chains.
The main focus of this article is analyzing the peculiarities and dynamics of socio-economic inequality in modern Russia. Examined are the changes in Russian people’s attitudes towards this multilateral and painful social issue, which are dictated by shifts both in objective reality and the way it is perceived by the general population. Analysis is based on data from «Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey» (RLMS-HSE). It is revealed that uneven distribution of income and accumulated wealth in post-Soviet Russia has become ever so dramatic. Meanwhile, like in most other countries of the world, a huge and constantly increasing and accelerating concentration of capital in the hands of a slim segment of the richest people is evident. These processes decrease the eff ectiveness of previously accepted criteria and indexes of socio-economic inequality, which leads to the need for fi ner adjustment of said instruments. Those who suff ered the most from a series of economic crises and stagnation, occurring throughout the period between 2008 and 2016, are those who belong to quite prosperous segments of the population, those which form the backbone of the middle-class. A decrease in the amount of wealthy households during the last crisis was accompanied by an increase in the amount of poor families, which became one of the reasons for an increase in the population’s dissatisfaction with their material status. Dramatic socioeconomic inequality remains the most prominent factor which forms inequality of opportunity when it comes to various population groups’ access to education, health-care and other social resources. However, unlike the 1990’s, when negative attitudes towards private property and rich people were dominant in Russian society, today we see a more moderate tolerance level towards socio-economic inequality.
This study considers the influence of structutal change to aggregate labour productivity growth of the Russian economy. The term “structural change” refers to labour reallocation both between industries and between formal and informal segments within an industry. Using Russia KLEMS and official Rosstat data we decompose aggregate labour productivity growth into intra-industry (within) and between industry effects with four alternative methods of the shift share analysis. All methods provide consistent results and demonstrate that total labour reallocation has been growth enhancing though the informality expansion has had the negative effect. As our study suggests, it is caused by growing variation in productivity levels across industries.
This article is dedicated to studying the condition and characteristics of Russian youths’ behavior in the labor market during economic crisis. The analysis is based on data from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey — Higher School of Economics (RLMS-HSE). It is revealed that the negative aftermath of the economic crisis, as well as expectations for the further decline of the economic situation, has undermined youths’ confidence in the labor market. They find themselves in an especially vulnerable position when enterprises shut down or in the case of job cuts. Opportunities for finding a job in the field of secondary employment have narrowed out, and there has been an increase in the amount of young people who are willing to work without signing an employment contract, who are ready to accept unfavorable working conditions. There is an acute sensation of incongruity between the demand for qualified workforce and those specialties which young people receive at higher educational facilities and secondary schools. The crisis has not only exacerbated many of the problems which young people face in the labor market, but it also has stimulated growth in the activity of young Russians when it comes to overcoming emerging troubles, not to mention it increased their interest in utilizing irregular means of material provision.
This article analyzes life satisfaction in Russia’s population over the last two decades, as well as its determinants, based on OECD methodology and data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey of the Higher School of Economics (RLMS-HSE). It shows that in Russia, which during its transformational period went through each phase of the business cycle with high oscillation amplitude, life satisfaction is more closely connected to the main economic indicators than in countries that have not experienced similar economic and social shocks. The way life satisfaction and its main determinants are correlated in Russia is similar to what we see in several other countries, but the specific values and forms of these connections depend on the particular motions of the economic cycle in any given country, as well as the previous path (model) of its development.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.