Strategic agility and international joint ventures: The willingness-ability paradox of family firms
Despite the considerable increase in studies on international joint ventures (IJVs) and family business, the two research streams have yet to be systemically integrated. Family firms have unique characteristics that affect their involvement in IJVs differently from their non-family counterparts. Indeed, family firms face a paradox entailing a lower willingness to form IJVs, but a higher ability to govern them. Drawing on three distinct components of strategic agility (i.e., strategic sensitivity, leadership unity, and resource fluidity), we develop a theoretical framework that unravels this paradox. Specifically, we argue that strong emotional attachment reduces family firms' strategic sensitivity, creating a motivational gap with respect to forming IJVs. On the other hand, when family firms overcome this gap by making full use of their board of directors, they have higher levels of leadership unity and resource fluidity. These dimensions lead to a greater ability to govern the complexities of the relationship, hence reducing opportunistic hazards, and significantly increasing the odds of the long-term success of IJVs. We develop propositions for empirical studies, and offer implications and directions for future research.
The article shows that the business world is Russia at the turn of XIX - XX centuries. had two centers of gravity: if cost (especially in heavy industry and in the banking sector) dominated the Petersburg, in the cultural and socio-political attitude of the province gravitated more to Moscow. While the leaders of big business in Moscow was made by the spokesmen of the interests of the majority of the Russian business of the Corporation.
We study the role of institutional deficiences, i.e. corruption, in affecting the innovative performance of family firms versus non-family businesses in 7 European countries and Russia that represent two large geographical areas with different history of institutional development. A comparative quantitative empirical analysis is based on the common self-edentitication of family firms and identical sample design of surveys implemented in EU in 2010 and in Russia in 2014, correspondingly. Keeping in mind the regional embeddedness of family firms (Stough et al, 2015) our analysis is extended at the regional level where regions are classified in two groups: with high and low level of corruption. Results show that propbability of family firms to innovate, either by the introduction of a new product or a new process, is higher than non-family firms in the case of the EU sample. As far as the role of corruption at the regional level, Russian family firms appear to be more innovative in regions with low corruption level while for European firms the results are mixed.
Game-theoretic model of election to a corporate board of directors is proposed. It is shown that the equilibrium distribution of seats is unique. The uniqueness guarantees nonmanipulability of elections. The distribution is obtained by the d’Hondt method of seats distribution in proportional representation problem. The model is tested on real data from a Russian company.
When writing this tutorial, the contributions received by the authors with the assistance of the NTF - National Training Fund subproject "Creating a center of excellence for economics teachers ' Innovation Project Development of education and work , received diplomas Russian competitions intellectual projects " Ideas for Russia " ( 2004) and "Power" (2008 , the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation ) . The manual is intended for students and undergraduates enrolled in the direction of "Economics" and "Management" , and may also be useful to managers and professionals , both financial and non-financial corporations.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.