Картезианская благость и проблема зла
This article develops a form of skeptical response to the arguments from evil. It argues that these arguments presuppose the form of epistemic optimism, which is assumed to be irrational in most of the spheres of human activity. First, it is shown that the arguments from evil conceptually depend on the concept of perfect moral goodness. Then, it is argued that the concept of perfect moral goodness can be analyzed through the concept of perfect moral reasons. Finally, the argument is proposed that our ability to figure out perfect reasons in the context of the problem of evil is unreliable. The essence of the proposed argument can be summarized in the following theses: 1) the reliability of the agent’s ability to evaluate the reasons for action in some field of activity depends on the degree of practical access of the agent to this field, where practical access means the ability to act in this field; 2) no human being providentially governs the world as it is expected from God, which implies a radical restriction of practical access to the reasons of God’s actions or omissions; 3) a radical restriction of practical access to the possible reasons of God can be considered as evidence for unreliability of our assessments of God’s reasons in the context of the problem of evil. But if these assessments are not reliable, then the process of reasoning that leads to the conclusion that certain evil in the world provides morally perfect reasons for some action of God is also not reliable. Therefore, evil cannot be considered as evidence for the non-existence of the perfectly good agent who follows perfect moral reasons.