Romanticism’s Longue Durée: 1968 and the projects of theory
The immediate purpose of this paper is to offer a brief reflection on 1968 as a nodal point in the appropriations and deployments of Romanticism, not least as a diagnostic tool. The article substantiates the case for the continuous after-life of Romanticism in the various guises of post-romanticism, a process which de-emphasizes the notion of period or indeed event, and constructs instead a complex discursive formation that re-negotiates past intellectual agendas and resources by framing them within a discursive longue durée. The article concentrates on the German scene of theory and the student protests during the second half of the 1960s. It traces the mediated links between them and demonstrates how this intellectual and political constellation is traversed by – repurposed and refashioned – Romantic discursive energies that are mobilized in order to make sense of, and respond to, the new developments. The groundwork and the hypotheses advanced in this article require a careful differentiation between two understandings (and projects) of “theory”. In the Conclusion, I discuss the impact of May ’68 on these two different theory projects.
This article addresses the question of philosophy and political program of contemporary Russian conservatism. The author analyses historical origins of this doctrine and the role of conservative romanticism in a framework of the current political process. From this position the author focuses on comparative analysis of Russian and West European forms of phenomenon under consideration.
The article focuses on investigation of personal attitudes toward oppositions of life. This research is following the principles of psychology of personal life attitudes and cultural psychology of personality. Some ways of explication of psychological knowledge about intuitive and reflexive personal attitudes to oppositions from cultural sources are suggested. As a data for hermeneutic analysis, texts of folk tales and Renaissance self-cognition text are provided. Author concentrates on self-developing and self-forming aspects of personal attitude to life oppositions.
A largely unquestioned assumption of (musical) aesthetics holds that art should imitate nature or try to reproduce in its own sphere the effects of natural beauty on the perceiver. The paper introduces a third dimension of the concept of beauty: 'cultural beauty', designating objects of art which have aesthetic value because of their relation to the culture we live in.
The close conceptual tie between music and nature originated in the aesthetic debates of the 18th century. Even Adorno is still indebted to this basic tenet of romanticism. Compositions by Ives (Central Park in the Dark) and Cage (Concert for Piano) negate this close connection between music and nature as a place of order: They relate to the world we live in and mirror its fragmentary, chaotic reality. Therefore, only if we take them to have cultural beauty, may we understand them properly.
Johannes Kepler (1571–1630) spielte als genialer Entdecker von Naturgesetzen eine zentrale Rolle in der frühen Naturphilosophie Schellings und Hegels; die Romantik feierte ihn als Prototypen des Genies schlechthin. Um 1840 setzt sich Schelling in einem veränderten Kontext für die erste Gesamtausgabe der Werke Keplers ein: Die Naturphilosophie wird nun vom Empirismus und Induktivismus scharf kritisiert. Neu entdeckte Dokumente belegen, wie man dennoch auf Kepler zurückgreifen konnte; gezeigt wird, dass sich idealistische und nach-idealistische Philosophieauffassungen also nicht ausschließen, sondern dass die von Idealisten und Romantikern betonte Genialität Keplers, seine Phantasie und Intuition, zu Kennzeichen wissenschaftlicher Methode umgedeutet werden können. – Die Darstellung wird durchgehend von großenteils neu erschlossenen und hier erstmals bekanntgemachten Archivalien, vor allem aus Briefwechseln, begleitet.
This book sheds new light on the continuing debate within political thought as to what constitutes power, and what distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate power. This book concludes by arguing that the Russian experience provides a useful lens through which ideas of power and legitimacy can be re-evaluated and re-interpreted, and through which the idea of “the West” as the ideal model can be questioned.
On the one hand, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is admittedly the integrative part of the history of phenomenological movement. On the other hand, the hermeneutical subject area, as well as disciplinary self-awareness of hermeneutics, diverges considerably from that of the initial E. Husserl's phenomenological project. This fact serves as a motif for reconstruction of the intrinsic logic of the phenomenological movement. The aim of such reconstruction is to answer the following questions: What is the reason for including philosophical hermeneutics into phenomenological philosophy? What role does hermeneutics play in the history of the phenomenological movement? The interpretation of phenomenological subject area in terms of primordial phenomenality serves as a horizon for this reconstruction of the essential logic of phenomenological research. Such understanding of phenomenological philosophy focus has priority over conventional characteristics of phenomenological subject matter as a variety of phenomena accessible within special methodological attitude. It allows, first of all, to avoid fragmentation of the area of primordial, i.e. phenomenological phenomena and to minimize presuppositions. The totality of phenomenality blocks constructivism inherent to descriptive phenomenology and in consequence limits the application field of reflexive or methodological approaches. The process of disclosing or articulating primordial phenomenality can be described as phenomenologising. Eventually, phenomenology as an explicative method is regarded as the first part of the two-level process of phenomenologising. The second part of this process is the spontaneous self-disclosing of primordial phenomenality. The idea of two-level phenomenology (phenomenology as a method and as a spontaneous event) has been differently realised in Heidegger's and Gadamer's phenomenological-hermeneutical conceptions. From the very beginning Heidegger stands up for the performative, i.e. existential-practical understanding of phenomenological explication. According to him, phenomenology does not so much explicate phenomena but points at those areas and forms of experience where that explication occurs spontaneously. Still, Heidegger is oriented at the explication of static structures of these experiences (which he calls existentialities), which allows us to speak about rudimentary transcendentalism of his philosophical position. In his late works Heidegger emphasises the world-disclosing potency of ontic experiences. Gadamer develops this tendency considering various everyday experiences such as perception of art, participation in rituals, reading, and etc. to be areas of spontaneous phenomenologising.