Реформа правового режима сделок хозяйственных обществ с заинтересованностью: шаг вперед, два шага назад?
Applying the methods of transaction costs theory, the author studies the rules of making and challenging interested party transactions, put into effect by the Federal Law 03.07.2016 №343-FL, and concludes that they are likely to cause the increase of agency costs rather than their reduction.
Biased assessment of economic benefits, bounded rationality and opportunism do not allow to create totally objective rules of making conflict of interest transactions. When making this kind of transactions, it is not possible to reach a voluntary agreement on prices and other terms by exceptionally the will of a party concerned, which gives grounds not to consider them contracts. Consequently, the most appropriate means of minimizing agency costs must be a preliminary management control giving back a contractual nature to these transactions.
However, instead of professional pre-inspection of effectiveness of interested party transactions the legislator has created a game situation the outcome of which depends on the plaintiff’s capabilities to prove the damages. In this, the concerned CEO – the defendant, who has violated the fiduciary duties, has the advantages: he has more and better information, he is protected by presumptions, and consequently, he bears lower costs on running the case.