Contagious corruption: cross-country comparisions
We investigate how prescriptive and descriptive norms affect the development of corruption over time. In particular, we are interested in whether the extent of corruption converges. If it does, we study how the level at which it converges depends on the prescriptive norms in the environment in which it takes place and on the information individuals have about others’ corrupt choices, that is, on descriptive norms. In a laboratory experiment implemented in Italy, China and the Netherlands, a Gneezy-type corruption task is used, with a real-effort task. We use a Krupka-Weber elicitation method to obtain information about existing prescriptive norms with respect to corrupt behavior. To induce natural variation in descriptive norms, we vary the type of information about others’ choices. Our results show that corruption is highly contagious everywhere, that is, descriptive norms affect choices. Nevertheless, differences in the effects of descriptive norms are evident across countries. Prescriptive norms concerning bribers’ and judges’ behaviors are observed to differ across the considered subject pools. While in China and the Netherlands it is highly socially inappropriate to bribe and, if you are a decision maker, to treat unfavorably people with high efforts and low bribes, in Italy the norms are the opposite.
The Handbook of Business and Corruption provides an overview of corrupt business practices in general and, more particularly, in different industry sectors, considering such practices from an ethical perspective.
The article analyzes the moral considerations, legal and market incentives for organizations to implement anti-corruption compliance. It also assesses the role of anti-corruption compliance in prevention of corruption offences.
This paper analyzes social norms in corruption by exploring whether engagement in bribery induces costly third-party punishment. By introducing third-party punishment in a bribery experiment we disentangle social norms from other non-normative motives ̶ such as retaliation, negative reciprocity ̶ maintained merely by parties involved in corruption. We manipulate two main characteristics of bribery: the private benefits gained by corrupt actors, and the negative externality generated by bribery on passive members of society. We find that third parties punish bribers more often than the bribed, but to a lesser extent. Greater private benefits induce third parties to punish more, whereas greater negative externalities have no impact on punishment choices. We unveil the role of emphatic anger as a microdeterminant of third-party punishment. We find gender differences in punishment behavior, with females being more willing to punish the bribed than males, but to a lesser amount.
The modern procurement system in Russia is considered to function economically and efficiently on the basis of principles of fair competition among its main participants. Practically the important principles of the procurement system are not implemented in all cases. The research agenda of authors focuses on the analysis of interactions between the economic agents in the procurement process, aimed at revealing the indicators of noncompetitive behavior between the buyers and the suppliers and only between the suppliers by means of econometrics (fuels and lubricants market of Moscow region as an example). The empirical data for the analysis consists of the information about the fulfilled purchases of oil-products in 4 neighboring districts of Moscow region: Orehovo-Zuevo, Pavlovskiy Posad, Egorievsk and Shatura in the period of 2007-2011.
As a result of intensive international debate and the adoption of a number of renowned international anticorruption conventions and initiatives in the 1990s and 2000s, the issue of corruption has become a convenient theme for different kinds of generalizations in social sciences. However, national legislation does not reflect these developments in its legal regulation due to conservatism inherent in jurisprudence.
One of the most evident gaps in this respect is the sphere of political corruption. While political science and political economy for decades have been successful in explaining political processes in different countries as corrupt conspiracies of political elites, business structures, and other actors in the political process, legal science has kept itself separate from such problems and prefers to deal with individual acts of corruption. But if for criminal law such an approach seems logical due to the methodology of the criminal law, for other branches of law which set forth a systemic view on social processes – primarily administrative and constitutional – there seems to be an omission.
Nowadays, there is a quite favourable environment for the development of a consistent legal understanding of anticorruption in Russia. This has become possible thanks to current Russian administrative reforms, when the need for a highly professional bureaucracy led to a greater demand for various anticorruption mechanisms. The next possible step in Russia may be an attempt to ensure the effectiveness of well-proven anti-corruption methods of the political system as a whole.
In this article we propose a brief background to the evolution of the concept of political corruption in Western and Russian political and legal science, which entails the necessity of complex scientific legal synthesis on this issue, allows to discuss the existing methodological potential and creates new opportunities to build up appropriate systemic legislative models.
There is a large consensus in the literature on the negative impact of corruption on economic growth and development. Due to its illegal and covered nature, the analysis of corruption is challenging to economists. The lack of data is the main barrier for researchers. Experimental approach allows to generate the required data and could become the most promising approach to study the determinants of corruption and to test the possible anti-corruption measures. In this paper we present the wide survey of the experimental evidence of corruption. In the first part we make the brief introduction into the experimental economics approach. The second part reviews in details the game-theoretic сorruption models. We find out that the lion’s share of these models has a standard design based on the simple two-agents’ interaction through bribery. In the third part we discuss the main findings encountered by the literature that use experimental techniques to study corruption. In particular, we analyse the cultural and gender difference in the propensities to engage into corruption behaviour, income and monitoring effects, factors that influence one's tolerance of corruption. Finally, in the last part we discuss advantages and disadvantages of the experimental approach for corruption studies.