Единый оператор инфраструктуры 5G: действительно ли экономия инвестиций достижима?
Creation of 5G network infrastructure is possible using various alternative forms. This article assesses single wholesale network (SWN) model, which implies concentration of access to key infrastructure facilities within one company. The main argument in favor of SWN is the estimated savings of investment costs, which seems to be highly relevant currently in Russia. But setting up SWN will require state regulation which implies additional costs. Any regulatory intervention deteriorates agents’ motivation. Lon-term economic consequences of such decisions can be more harmful than the consequences of the problems these interventions were aimed.
The authors analyze the system of incentives that result from the monopolization of network assets, options to finance telecommunication infrastructure construction in a whole and particularly – the free-riding problem in case of take-or-pay principal as well as regulation issues and its effects.
The article shows limitations for SWN’s efficiency presenting quantitative analysis of the consequences associated with the SWN’s incentives to inflate capex, regulation inefficiency, guaranteeing non-discriminatory access as well as additional costs to comply with state procurement rules.
The methodology may be used for regulatory impact assessment that make the article especially valuable in analysis of state intervention.