Теоретико-игровое моделирование контроля слияния предприятий
The paper deals with the problem of the occurrence of errors of the second type (erroneous transaction approval) when regulating economic concentration transactions. The purpose of antitrust regulation in this case is to prevent transactions detrimental to competition. Each transaction could, on the one hand, lead to a price increase due to the strengthening of monopoly power; on the other hand, generate a synergistic effect in the form of lower marginal costs. The difficulty lies in the fact that the antimonopoly authority may not be completely informed about the magnitude of such an effect. A game-theoretic model in which firms interact according to the Cournot model has been chosen for the simulation. If competition authority is able to observe the level of synergy merger, type II errors do not occur. In case of imperfect information, synergy would define the probability of a type II error.
This article is motivated by a growing interest in the problem of merger control quality assessment. Remedies are one of the instruments of merger control and have a significant influence on the results of it. This paper aims to build and empirically evaluate a discrete choice model of merger remedies implementation in Russian merger control. The database consists of 502 merger cases accepted by the Russian antimonopoly agency between 2010 and 2012. We analyse the agency’s decisions to find which characteristics of merging firms and markets lead the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation to decide whether to allow conditional acceptance. We find that variables related to high market power such as high market share and significant entry barriers more frequently result in a remedy outcome. Such industries as the coal mining and chemical industry positively affect the probability of a remedy implementation. At the same time we do not find significant effects of such high-concentrated industries as energy and gas. In addition, the results also demonstrate that if one of the 5 giant firms take part in a merger, it has a positive effect on the probability of the remedy decisions. Our study did not detect the influence of the firm-buyer’s countries on using remedies.
This article is motivated by a growing interest in the issue of merger control quality assessment. Remedies are one of the tools to control mergers and to have a significant influence on their results. This paper aims to analyze the merger remedies implementation in Russian merger control between 2007 and 2013. We have collected the database consisting of 134 merger cases accepted with remedies by the Russian antimonopoly agency. We analyzed the content of agency’s decisions and characterize how Russian authorities use behavioral and structural conditions. This helps us find special features of implementing remedies in Russian merger control. We try to explain the differences between Russian and developed countries practices.
The present study focuses on the deterrence effects of Russian merger control. The impact of merger control instruments (remedies and prohibitions) on future merger activity reflects the mechanism of the deterrence effects. We use panel data on merger control decisions to estimate empirically the ability of antitrust actions to deter firms from merging. The estimation procedure was based on several methods including Arellano— Bond estimator. The findings of the research illustrate the presence of deterrence effects of Russian merger control. At the same time remedies do not involve deterrence effects in Russia whereas prohibitions can deter future merger activity. Studying deterrence effects of merger policy tools may be an essential step in understanding benefits of merger control as deterrent effects may be even more substantial than direct effects of merger control.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.