Article analyzes the position of famous naturalist Vladimir Vernadsky in period 1917-1918, and his active participation in the reorganization of university education in Petrograd Provisional government , and in revolutionary Kiev . Vernadsky opponents in Kiev were as nationally minded Ukrainian intellectuals (like historian Hrushevsky ) and conservative professors former Imperial University of St.. Vladimir in Kiev . These contradictions and conflicts affected and then on different assessments " academic revolution " in Kiev and Ukraine among Ukrainian and Russian emigration after 1922.
Eugenij Anisimov notes the high level of research made by Tatiana Tairova-Yakovleva, in particular considering the pieces about Ukrainian history. He notes that the problem of treason by I. Mazepa can be interpreted more generally and the fact of treason undoubtly took place.
Alexander Besov believes that the book about Hetman Mazepa by Tatiana Tairova-Yakovleva focuses rather on teleology than history. However, he fi nds the way of the author’s interpretation of the «Russia-Ukraine relations» in late 17th - early 18th centuries quite mistakable.
Alexander Kamenskii thinks that Tatiana Tairova’s book is a serious attempt of constructing a scholar biography of Ivan Mazepa. In several cases she has managed to refute some myths in historiography. One may hope that the book will stimulate other historians to conduct further research. However, they will not be able to ignore Tairova’s conception.
A. S. Karevin considers that Tairova-Yakovleva’s book is full of numerous mistakes, contradictions and baseless conclusions. The drawbacks make us not to regard the book as established scientifi c study.
Kirill Kochegarov fi nds that Mrs. Tairova-Yakovleva’s book combine several interesting observations with unacceptable and controversial points. In generally the very idea of the study seems to idealize the Mazepa personality as well as his policy. The author also overestimates the importance of the so-called Moscow clauses, grossly exaggerates Mazepa’s participation in the Russian foreign affairs, and erroneously regards centralizing military administration measures of Russian government as large-scale administrative reform in Ukraine. Moreover, active role in Church reform of Peter the Great declared by Mrs. Tairova-Yakovleva Mazepa’s has not been proved.
Igor Kurukin: Despite the information on administrative reform of 1707 (s.322-330) given by the author, it isn’t clear, was the Ukrainian autonomy liquidated or not. There is a disputable question on what extend was Mazepa supported by the Ukraine people as well as cossack «starshina». Provinces being attached to Russia Baltic were able to remain independent for one and a half centuries. Being different by birth Ukrainian elite did’t manage to develop rules of corporate behavior and solidarity.
Plokhii Serhii: The myth of Mazepa as betrayer have been solidly examined in Mrs. Tairova-Yakovleva’s scientifi c and creative lab. The author has succeed in showing — and more carefully than her redecessor — the diffi culty of both personal and public, geopolitics, choice which Mazepa had to make. The book is, if it is a proper name, the most balanced judgment of the hetman I have ever read.
Chukhlib Taras. The violation of oath to the Russian monarch by Ukrainian Hetmanstate was interpreted by Ivan Mazepa and his government as tyrannical action of Peter the Great. Therefore, the hetman received the right to refuse from «the high hand» of tsar and look for another suzerain to maintain his vassal autonomy.
T. H. Tairova-Yakovleva finds this decision quite adequate and revealing us the logic of actions of the Ukrainian leader.
This paper analyzes Belarus energy system, relations between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia in the framework of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space. The consequences of the recent political crisis in Ukraine will inevitably lead to the review of the relations between the European Union and Russia. In these new conditions, the members of the Common Economic Space of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia must develop a new concept of energy security. This new concept should allow to decrease substantially the influence of the export of hydrocarbons on the economic development of abovementioned countries, thus increasing the competitiveness of their national economies. As a first measure, the members of the Eurasian Union should create the single energy market
The article analyses the struggle of the broad public circles in the U.S. against the outbreak of the Cold War, attempts to maintain an alliance with the USSR.
The recent crisis in Ukraine cast a spotlight on those countries located between Russia and the EU, a region that had long existed beneath the radar of international politics. Indeed, even its name remains indeterminate: the term 'post-Soviet' is too encompassing (it could also designate Estonia or Tajikistan) while the notion of 'Eastern Europe' has long lost any geographical anchor. Instead, this space is often named after regional powers’ attempts to shape it: as the EU’s 'Eastern Neighbourhood' or as Russia’s 'Near Abroad'. The new region-building endeavour pursued by Russia through Eurasian integration frameworks is a crucial development in this regard.
On the 29 of May 2014, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed the Treaty establishing the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which extends the provisions of the existing Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) and comes into being in 2015. This integration regime has been lauded by Russian President Vladimir Putin as a new, better version of the European Union, and castigated by US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton as a new form of the Soviet Union. This report shows that it is neither. The EEU is a modern and far-reaching attempt at economic integration, but one that is weakened by internal and conceptual contradictions. What was designed as a geo-economic framework is increasingly becoming a geopolitical issue. In attempting to counter the influence of the EU’s alternative integration regime (the Eastern Partnership), Russia has shifted its diplomacy from persuasion to coercion, and Moscow is increasingly resorting to using the EEU as a foreign policy tool. The countries of the entredeux – literally, something placed between two things – are being forced to face to a geopolitical choice they had been trying to avoid, or at least to defuse. Divisive domestic politics, separatism, structural dependencies and the economic and political calculations of internal actors are key factors mediating and complicating their choice. This report focuses on these issues that are too often overlooked in the debate on Russia-EU regional competition.
The application of «protective reservations» is a fundamental principle of modern codifications of the private international law. The post-graduate student of the Private International Law Department, Faculty of Laws, National Research University «The Higher School of Economics», the advocate E.A. Kruty (e-mail: email@example.com) minutely analyses provisions about the reservation about the public policy and mandatory rules which are included in the international acts and ten national codifications of XXI centuries (Azerbaijan, Lithuania, Estonia, Mongolia, Russia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Macedonia, Turkey). Despite the apparent prevalence of the negative construction of the reservation about the public policy the lawmaker prefers in some situations its positive variant. An appeal to codifications allows to identify the certain conditions on which protective reservations take effect. Their most detailed description is contained in the Belgian and Bulgarian codes. Not less interesting is a regulation of the legal consequences coming as a result of application of these legal institutions for private legal relations with a foreign element including in the international civil procedure.
In 2004 the "Orange Revolution" put Ukraine back on Europe's mental map and the new government made entry into the EU a priority. But imperial-era preconceptions still influence foreign attitudes towards Ukraine and in Ukraine political independence from Russia is not matched by economic, cultural and psychological independence. Ukraine's pro-EU leaders not only face entrenched political rivals who maintain the institutional infrastructure of Russian language-use and promote pro-Russian nostalgia for the soviet past, they must deal with foreign business people whose activities keep Ukraine in the Russian-language communications sphere and politicians afraid of "fragmenting Russia". This book surveys the Ukrainian-EU relationship in light of the legacies of Russian rule. Its authors review and examine not only existing policies but also the long-term underlying interrelationships between national identities, loyalties, political/cultural orientations and political trends.
This comparative study shows how the revival of geopolitics came not despite, but because of, the end of the Cold War. Disoriented in their self-understandings and conception of external role by the events of 1989, many European foreign policy actors used the determinism of geopolitical thought to find their place in world politics quickly. The book develops a constructivist methodology to study causal mechanisms, and its comparative approach allows for a broad assessment of some of the fundamental dynamics of European security.