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Article

В защиту "строгого Петражицкианства"

Фиттипальди Э.

In Human rights in the context of a Petrażyckian perspective Prof. Polyakov criticized Fittipaldi’s “Strict Petrażyckianism”. Here Fittipaldi replies to Polyakov’s critiques. Fittipaldi argues that scientific concepts select classes of phenomena able to enter as causes into nomological hypotheses. Law, stipulatively defined as a particular class of psychical phenomena (psylaw) — namely, as perceptions/representations of actions coupled imperative-attributive emotions (a concept close to sense of entitlement) — is the proximate cause of conflicts and, in turn, of unifying tendencies somewhat counteracting them (positivization, formalizations, dikaspolization — from dikaspoloi). Further, psylaw causes the emergence of soclaw, understood as a gradual phenomenon whose degrees of existence increase with the degree of compatibility of the jural phenomena (psylaw) occurring in a given society. If psylaw is the distal cause of phenomena like states or market economies, soclaw can be regarded as their proximal cause, and so can be regarded as a legitimate scientific concept. In the remaining parts of this essay Fittipaldi defends the distinction between of intuitive and positive psylaw, and underscores the need both of legal dogmatics (understood as including deontic logic) and of sharply distinguishing it from psylaw and soclaw, thus implying that strict Petrażyckianism is probably incompatible with integral concepts of law.