Non-monetary incentives in online experiments
Monetary incentives in online experiments are not always easy to implement. Yet online
experiments are advantageous in terms of a natural decision-making environment, less
stress on participants and a large number of the latter. Can we obtain plausible results from
online experiments by using non-monetary incentives like altruism and curiosity? We
investigate the role of non-monetary incentives in a simple Ellsberg-type experiment which
can be easily compared to similar lab experiments.
Monetary incentives in online experiments are not always easy to implement. Yet online experiments are advantageous in terms of natural decision-making environment, less stress on participants and large number of the latter. Can we obtain plausible results from online experiments by using non-monetary in- centives like altruism and curiosity? We investigate the role of non-monetary incentives in a simple Ellsberg-type experiment which can be easily compared to similar lab experiments.
State Capitalism could be characterized by a triple role of the state: the state performs as a “programmer” to guide economic activity; it acts as a “protector” to safeguard national economic interests; and it also plays the role as a “producer” to create national wealth through its state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, the influences of State Capitalism in a country are not only limited to the domestic sphere. They often extend internationally, either through the globalization of SOEs, or through Sovereign Fund investments, or by means of other influences. Many recent acquisition projects by SOEs, often in strategic sectors, highlight the importance of understanding this new geopolitical investment which has created special relations between State Capitalism and the free market. They also raise the question of the need for updating national economic security concerns in the context of globalization. As the value of Sovereign Funds reaches several trillion dollars, the controversy surrounding these Funds is evolving. For many, these Funds do not necessarily always look for maximizing business performance, but are sometimes also accompanied by political and strategic ambitions of the respective states from where they originate. The phenomenon of State Capitalism has gained prominence in recent years especially in several emerging markets. It appeared, firstly, because of multiple government interventions in the economy,and secondly, emphasis given to the globalization of their SOEs / economic organizations in international markets (China, Russia, Brazil, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, India, Korea, etc.). In January 2012, The Economist published another special article on State Capitalism and wondered if the new balance of power that is being built-up with the emergence of market oriented SOEs will pose a challenge to the liberal capitalist model. The objectives of this conference are manifold: to examine the characteristics of State Capitalism in the world economy, especially in emerging countries, to assess its real impact on economic development, to identify its scope to other developing countries, and also to explore the major challenges that it poses to the liberal capitalist model in the world of free-markets.
The paper consists of three main sections. The first is devoted to a discussion of the "state capitalism" concept and the reasons for the growing interest to this phenomenon. It is proposed here to consider the state capitalism not only in terms of the state ownership in major national industrial enterprises and banks, but also taking into account the efficiency of SOEs. In the second section, the new data on the state involvement in the Russian economy are represented, including the shares of the state in the authorized capital of the largest industrial enterprises and banks. Their economic indicators are compared. Contrary to some assumptions P / E values for national champions are lagging behind the average for emerging markets. The third section examines the hypothesis that one of the major challenges faced by the state capitalism is the development of investment incentives for SOEs and their performance. It is shown that the interests of the state as an owner of business enterprises are often in conflict with the interests of the state as a social institution. A number of examples are demonstrated. In order to solve this problem the state should reduce its stakes in SOEs except for those that are of strategic importance. The output of the analysis is that the state capitalism as a social phenomenon has no a long-term perspective. Most of so called “state capitalist” countries will take in future the path of traditional mixed market economy.
Certain altruistic phenomena in the workplace that exceed the bounds of contract theory can be explained within the framework of gift exchange theory. We discuss the application of gift exchange theory to interactions between an employer and an employee as well as between employees themselves. We emphasize the opportunities of gifts to improve coordination and contract efficiency in the workplace and argue that there exists the productive function of gifts. We use the framework of a market for externalities in order to demonstrate that given the interrelated activities of agents a gift exchange between them can lead to Pareto improvement.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.
The paper studies a problem of optimal insurer’s choice of a risk-sharing policy in a dynamic risk model, so-called Cramer-Lundberg process, over infinite time interval. Additional constraints are imposed on residual risks of insureds: on mean value or with probability one. An optimal control problem of minimizing a functional of the form of variation coefficient is solved. We show that: in the first case the optimum is achieved at stop loss insurance policies, in the second case the optimal insurance is a combination of stop loss and deductible policies. It is proved that the obtained results can be easily applied to problems with other optimization criteria: maximization of long-run utility and minimization of probability of a deviation from mean trajectory.