The paper develops a new extension of the sequential preference condition, which leads to unique stable matching in all subpopulations, obtained by consistent restrictions of the marriage matching problem. Under the new condition, the Gale–Shapley algorithm is stable, consistent, strategy-proof, Pareto optimal for men, and Pareto optimal for women.
We modify Paul Krugman’s (1991, J. Polit. Econ 9(3), 483-99) ‘Core-Periphery’ model by replacing the traditional competitive sector by a monopolistically competitive one. We show that the structure of spatial equilibria remains the same as in the original model. This result continues to hold true under Cournot or Bertrand oligopolistic competition with free entry in the traditional sector. The key factor that explains why the nature of competition in the traditional sector does not matter for the spatial equilibria is constant expenditure shares - due to nested Cobb-Douglas and CES preferences - which imply that trade in the traditional sector is independent from its sectoral characteristics.
In screening with non-concave costs: (i) cycles of active IC constraints can make all packages distorted; (ii) standard screening can be less profitable than price discrimination within a consumer type using first-come-first-served rationing.
In Lowest-Unmatched Price Auctions (LUPA) all participants pay a bidding fee and the lowest bid placed by only one participant wins. Many LUPAs do not specify what happens with the item on offer if there is no unmatched bid. The item may remain with the auctioneer which may appear unfair given that the auctioneer collects the bidding fees. We show that in a symmetric Nash equilibrium of a LUPA with known prize both players and the auctioneer will have an expected profit of zero. Moreover, LUPAs may be seen as a value-revealing mechanism.
We experimentally study the causal effect of being an immigrant or previously convicted on the hiring preferences and wage payments of employers. We find evidence for statistical discrimination against immigrants. Criminal offenders suffer from more severe and taste discrimination.
We apply the die rolling experiment of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) to a two-player tournament incentive scheme. Our treatments vary the prize spread. The data highlights that honesty is more pronounced when the prize spread is small.
By deriving a ‘housing market Hosios condition’, we show that the main conclusions of the seminal paper on housing search frictions by Wheaton (1990) were erroneously derived. We show that households may search too much, optimally, or too little, which is in contrast to the paper’s conclusion that they always search too little. Furthermore, we show that exogenous increases in housing vacancies always have a negative effect on house prices, given standard assumptions.
This paper studies whether a pension reform, namely a switch from a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) to a more-funded scheme should be announced. We show that such an announcement increases savings, leading to a decline in interest rates. Smaller returns to savings lead to higher losses for the first transitional generation, which suffers from the reform the most. On the other hand, higher savings by the first transitional generation lead to faster capital accumulation, which benefits younger generations. We argue that if a government cares about the agents with the most to lose, it may more beneficial not to announce such a reform.
We study the impact of information revelation on efficiency in auctions. In a constrained-efficient mechanism, i.e. a mechanism that is efficient subject to the incentive-compatibility constraint, any additional information available to bidders increases the expected efficiency of the mechanism. This result cannot be extended to a more general setup: In a second-price sealed-bid auction, revelation of information might lead to efficiency losses.
I study the institution of avoiding to hire one’s school own PhD graduates for assistant professorships. I argue that this institution is necessary to create better incentives for researchers to incorporate new information in studies, facilitating the convergence to asymptotic learning of the studied fundamentals.
We derive a simple necessary and sufficient condition on preferences for the market outcome to be socially optimal under monopolistic competition with input-output (IO) linkages. Preferences that satisfy this condition are typically non-CES and display pro-competitive effects, although they converge to the CES when IO linkages become negligibly weak. We show that the equilibrium with pro-competitive effects may deliver both excess and insufficient entry of firms in equilibrium.
We present processes on stock exchange as two random processes one of which reflects the regular regime of economy and the other one–crises. If regular processes are correctly recognized with the probability slightly higher than 1/2, this gives positive average gain to the player. We believe that this very phenomenon lies on the basis of unwillingness of people to expect crises permanently and to try recognizing them.
A highly skilled immigration can be growth enhancing if the positive contribution of the imported brains to the host economy’s human capital stock outweighs the immigration-induced adverse effect on educational incentives for natives, or growth depleting if the latter effect dominates.
We suggest to use Internet car sale price advertisements for measuring economic inequality between and within German regions. Our estimates of regional income levels and Gini indices based on advertisements are highly, positively correlated with the official figures. This implies that the observed car prices can serve as a reasonably good proxy for income levels. In contrast to the traditional measures, our data can be fast and inexpensively retrieved from the web, and more importantly allow to estimate Gini indices at the NUTS2 level-something that never has been done before. Our approach to measuring regional inequality is a useful alternative source of information that could complement officially available measures.
We develop a model of monopolistic competition that accounts for consumers' heterogeneity in both incomes and preferences. This model makes it possible to study the implications of income redistribution on the toughness of competition. We show how the market outcome depends on the joint distribution of consumers' tastes and incomes and obtain a closed-form solution for a symmetric equilibrium. Competition toughness is measured by the weighted average elasticity of substitution. Income redistribution generically affects the market outcome, even when incomes are redistributed across consumers with different tastes in a way such that the overall income distribution remains the same.
Monetary incentives in online experiments are not always easy to implement. Yet online experiments are advantageous in terms of natural decision-making environment, less stress on participants and large number of the latter. Can we obtain plausible results from online experiments by using non-monetary in- centives like altruism and curiosity? We investigate the role of non-monetary incentives in a simple Ellsberg-type experiment which can be easily compared to similar lab experiments.
Monetary incentives in online experiments are not always easy to implement. Yet online experiments are advantageous in terms of a natural decision-making environment, less stress on participants and a large number of the latter. Can we obtain plausible results from online experiments by using non-monetary incentives like altruism and curiosity? We investigate the role of non-monetary incentives in a simple Ellsberg-type experiment which can be easily compared to similar lab experiments.
We consider a model of monopolistic competition with several heterogeneous sectors and endogenous labor supply. For low (high) values of the labor supply elasticity, we show that there is always a unique equilibrium. For medium values of the labor supply elasticity, there are either zero or two equilibria.