Структура воображения и восприятия как критерий их различения в работах Э. Гуссерля
The problem of making a difference between image consciousness and perception plays a great epistemological role in Edmund Husserl's works. The proposition that perception, unlike the image consciousness, reaches the thing itself but not just the copy (image) of the thing, as it is supposed by the followers of the “image-theory”, makes possible to consider the experience to be the legitimate source of knowledge (and finally to prove the possibility of science). Therefore it is very important to find out not quantitative but qualitative, essential, differences between perception and image consciousness. One of the moments, according to which the above-mentioned modes of consciousness may be distinguished, is their structure. This idea may seem evident only at first sight. According to the complicacy of structure Husserl draws a distinction between simple acts of consciousness and complex (founded) acts of consciousness. In a simple act the object is set before consciousness as an object, becomes presented to consciousness, and this makes possible to form further reference to this object (so that it may become an object of judgement, evaluation, feeling, desire etc.). Criticizing the “image-theory” Husserl points out that image consciousness is a founded act, unlike perception. It means that the object appears but isn’t taken by itself, it functions like the representant, analogue (Husserl names it “Bildobjekt”), which makes possible for consciousness to have reference to another object, which doesn’t appear and isn’t presented, but is meant by consciousness, is re-presented (Husserl names it “Bildsujet”). This proposition shows that “being representative” can’t be a “real predicate” of an object but is a result of its peculiar apperception as such by the spontaneous act of consciousness. Criticizing the “image-theory” Husserl distinguishes between the act of perception and the act of image consciousness in which image has physical nature. But it is necessary to mention that image may have mental nature as well. In the latter case an act of image consciousness is named “phantasy”. At first he supposed that phantasy is also a founded act and gave a description of it using the same scheme (Bildobjekt – Bildsujet). But hereafter he came to the opinion that “simple presentation of phantasy” is not complex but a simple act of consciousness. Despite the latter proposition seems to be more reasonable, it again rises the problem of drawing a distinction between perception and image consciousness.