Влияние Российских Губернаторов на Распределение Государственных Контрактов
This paper analyses the impact of governor’s tenure and his/her local ties on restriction of competition in the allocation of public procurement contracts. Basing on existing literature, we proposed that (1) tenure’s impact on competition in public procurement is non-linear and (2) it depends on governor’s pre-existing work experience in the region before he/she was elected/appointed. To test these hypotheses we employ contract-level data for the whole population of public contracts on road constructions in Russian regions during 2011-2014, and governor’s biographical information. Analysis showed that during first two terms of new governor in office the procurement competition increases and then starts to decrease. Such non-linear effect is especially prominent for governors-outsiders – the ones without pre-existing local ties. At the same time, this effect is not observable for the governors who came from the regional elite. Moreover, previous work experience in the region leads to higher procurement competition on average. We also showed that restriction of competition for governors-outsiders could not be explained by the increase of contract execution quality: execution delays increase linearly and the probability of execution terminating is not decreasing with the increase of governor’s tenure.
In the present paper we have hypothesized an explanation for the fact that the evaluation
of the social impact of law is modeled predominantly by the economic efficiency concept.
Considering the early stages of the concept’s development, we try to make it more
intelligible to the European lawyers.
Electron bunching processes in a carcinotrode (backward_wave oscillator with self_modulation of electron emission) operating in the high_efficiency regime determined previously are investigated. The possibility of obtaining an efficiency of about 80% is explained from the physical viewpoint.
There is by now a large literature arguing that auctions with a variety of after-market interactions may not yield an efficient allocation of the objects for sale, especially when the bidders impose strong negative externalities upon each other. In this note, we argue that these inefficiencies can be avoided by asking bidders prior to the auction to submit any publicly observable payment they would like to make. These payments, so-called flexible entry fees, do not affect the allocation decision of the auctioneer. We show that auctions with flexible entry fees have a fully revealing equilibrium where bidders signal their type before the auction itself takes place.
The main purpose of this monograph is to identify the key factors of risk man- agement efficiency of firm, whose management is able to increase the investment attractiveness of the business in general, as well as the formation of an effective or- ganizational risk management model that allows, on the one hand - to provide reliable protection for companies against unexpected losses, on the other hand - to make a risk management tool for the creation of corporate value. This monograph presents the organization of risk management in accordance with the latest regulatory require- ments. In the monograph authors provide a developed methods for evaluating the effectiveness of existing mechanisms of risk management, based on a representative theoretical review of the scientific literature of leading researchers in the field of risk management and internal control. In addition, an algorithm for evaluating the econom- ic and investment efficiency of the risk management is given, that takes into account the existing methods of performance evaluation, as well as recommendations on the organization of internal compliance as a tool ensuring the consistency of individual and corporate interests of the company. Most of the conclusions and positions pre- sented in the book, confirmed by empirical calculations on the example of Russian and international companies.
The book contains the results of studies to assess the effectiveness of corporate risk management. This monograph is intended for students, teachers and scientists, researchers, and professionals operating in the field of risk management.
Usually marketization is associated with the commercialization as the desire for recovery of the profit. This means replacing the educational functions to the provision of services, with all the unfortunate consequences. However, such an approach is superficial and emotional. The orientation of higher education on the client is very appropriate. Moreover, it is able to put a lot into place.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.