Влияние Российских Губернаторов на Распределение Государственных Контрактов
This paper analyses the impact of governor’s tenure and his/her local ties on restriction of competition in the allocation of public procurement contracts. Basing on existing literature, we proposed that (1) tenure’s impact on competition in public procurement is non-linear and (2) it depends on governor’s pre-existing work experience in the region before he/she was elected/appointed. To test these hypotheses we employ contract-level data for the whole population of public contracts on road constructions in Russian regions during 2011-2014, and governor’s biographical information. Analysis showed that during first two terms of new governor in office the procurement competition increases and then starts to decrease. Such non-linear effect is especially prominent for governors-outsiders – the ones without pre-existing local ties. At the same time, this effect is not observable for the governors who came from the regional elite. Moreover, previous work experience in the region leads to higher procurement competition on average. We also showed that restriction of competition for governors-outsiders could not be explained by the increase of contract execution quality: execution delays increase linearly and the probability of execution terminating is not decreasing with the increase of governor’s tenure.