Ханчжоуский консенсус: наследие для Китая, «Группы двадцати» и мирового сообщества
China took over the G20 2016 presidency from Turkey at a period of subdued economic activity and diminished global growth. Growth in China was expected to slow to 6.3 percent in 2016 and 6.0 percent in 2017, primarily reflecting weaker investment growth as the economy continued to rebalance. Acknowledging that lower growth rates became the “new normal” Chinese leadership set the annual target growth rate for China to be no less than 6.5 percent in its 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020). The Plan redefined China’s development paradigm from speed to quality based on innovation, coordination, green development, opening up and sharing. This vision constituted the foundation of China’s concept and priorities for the G20 presidency. The article reviews main outcomes of the Chinese G20 presidency focusing on major results which reflect China’s priorities for domestic development and international cooperation. Using qualitative and quantitative analysis of the G20 2016 documents and the documents of international organizations the author highlights the key decisions made at the Hangzhou summit and trends in G20 engagement with international institutions. The findings indicate that the Chinese Presidency priorities of development, innovation and trade received unprecedented attentions with development reaching almost 43% share in the discourse (compared to the average of 15% for the eleven summits), innovation rising tenfold to about 7% (compared to 0.75% for the eleven summits) and trade peaking to 7.3 (compared to the 2.8 average). At 2.2% the share of G20 discourse on environment was higher than the overall average (1.42%) and any other summit except Cannes and Los Cabos. While lower than for Brisbane and Antalya energy issues (about 4%) are comparable to the average for the period (3.4%). Economic issues share (at 25%) was close to the average for the period (27%). In line with the historical trend the share of finance issues in the G20 discourse continued to decline, reflecting the G20 role in the division of labor with regard to financial markets regulation. Intensity of G20 engagement with international organizations was higher than the average since the Washington summit. The choice of organizations was defined by the presidency priorities and established trends. Given the UN role in the Sustainable Development Goals, and China’s commitment to the UN as the central element of a fair and peaceful multilateral system, it came as no surprise that the intensity of references to the UN was twice as high as the average for G20 and significantly higher than in any other summit. A similar trend is observed for the WTO and UNCTAD. G20 reliance on the OECD expertise continued to rise. Intensity of G20 engagement with the IMF and the WB was slightly lower than in the previous presidencies. Last but not least, China consolidated G20 dialogue with engagement groups, most notably with B20 and L20.
Drawing on the qualitative and quantitative analysis results the author concludes that China’s G20 presidency contributed to the country’s development priorities, reflected China’s role in the evolving world order, and consolidated G20 status as the premier forum for economic cooperation and capability to make globalization work for all. The author asserts that China managed to ensure its imprint on G20 future cooperation, first, by integrating innovation, new industrial revolution and digital economy into its core agenda, generating 137 commitments on innovative growth and setting up relevant international mechanisms. Second, on trade and investment it facilitated development and adoption of two documents defining guiding principles for global investment policymaking, and promoting inclusive trade and global value chains. Third, under China’s stewardship G20 agreed three action plans on energy cooperation, including Enhancing Energy Access in Asia and the Pacific: Key Challenges and G20 Voluntary Collaboration Action Plan, G20 Voluntary Action Plan on Renewable Energy, and G20 Energy Efficiency Leading Programme (EELP) making further progress to address energy access, cleaner energy future, energy efficiency, global energy architecture, energy security, as well as market transparency. Fourth, China advanced further G20 cooperation on development based on the Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Fifth, the Presidency committed to establish three China based G20 centers, thus creating opportunities to enhance its influence on the G20 process through evidence base, research and knowledge exchange on key policy areas. China struck a good balance in continuity and innovation of the G20 agenda, contributed to its legitimacy and effectiveness through productive engagement with key international organizations and dialogue with the engagement groups, and consolidated G20 capacity for direction setting, decision making and delivery.