Вертикальные ограничивающие соглашения как инструмент понижения рискованности лотерей
Abstract. Vertical restraints such as exclusive territories may be considered as an alternative to the compensation paid to retailers for taking the risks associated with market shocks . For the first time this approach has been put forward in (Rey & Tirole, 1986). In (Hansen & Motta, 2015) this concept has been further developed, but these authors have come a diametrically opposite result to what Rey & Tirole had reported. The goal of both papers was to compare exclusive territories and retailers’ competition from the point of view of the supplier. In (Rey & Tirole, 1986) the competition was the preferred solution, in (Hansen & Motta, 2015) - the exclusive territories. The explanation of this discrepancy proposed in (Hansen & Motta 2015) doesn't look convincing enough. The paper proposes a new explanation based on the analysis of the attractiveness of the considered lotteries for the retailers. In (Rey & Tirole, 1986) they were ready to pay for the lottery, but in (Hansen & Motta, 2015) - pretend to get a compensation. Accordingly, in the first case the supplier prefers to allow competition between dealers, in the second - to provide exclusive territories in order to reduce the compensation to be paid to the dealer for participating in the lottery. The article discusses that the better solution is to consider not the risks associated with market shocks, but the retailers’ risks associated with the so called «cooperative specific investments» (manufacturer can prefer another partner on ex post stage). Trying to support the retailers’ incentives to make cooperative investments, supplier voluntarily redistributes control in favor of retailers.